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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS AND
MICROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between the education-based fertility
gap and economic growth and on policy as a determinant of fertility.
In the first essay I evaluate the impact of differential fertility (the difference between
fertility rates of women with high educational attainment and women with low educational
attainment) on economic growth by accounting for critical marginal effects and the general
level of educational attainment in a given country. I also examine the possibility that this
effect varies based on level of inequality and income levels. I find that for a less developed
country with high income inequality, higher fertility rates of women with lower education
has a favorable impact on economic development.
In the second essay I examine the transmission and magnitude of the effect of
differential fertility on economic growth at the subnational level. I explore the relationship
between differential fertility and economic growth in a cross-U.S. state context. I find that a
larger gap in fertility rates between highly-educated and less-educated women is strongly
associated with a decrease in the rate of long-run economic growth across U.S. states, even
after accounting for the levels of inequality and overall fertility.
In the third essay I explore policy as a determinant of the education-based fertility
gap. I use the 2007 Massachusetts healthcare reform which provides a good setting for
evaluating the effect of an exogenous policy on the fertility. I find that fertility increases
among young married women and decreases among young unmarried women but that there
is no asymmetrical fertility response based on the education level of the mother.
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1. Introduction
A significant decline in fertility rates has been observed in developed countries
over the last century. The same trend has emerged later in parts of the developing world.
This decline in fertility rates is strongly associated with substantial gains in income per
capita. Therefore, an important question that needs to be addressed is the existence of a
causal relationship between population trends and changes in income levels. However,
demographic dynamics are not exogenously determined but are the result of the
complicated interplay of a variety of factors among which policy plays an important role.
The first and second essays examine the role of group-specific fertility on long-run
economic growth at the cross country level and at the state level respectively, while the
third essay evaluates healthcare policy as a determinant of fertility rates in the U.S.
Differential Fertility and Economic Growth: The Role of Inequality and Human Capital
In the first essay, I evaluate the impact of fertility on economic growth by
accounting for critical marginal effects of differential fertility (the difference between
fertility rates of women with low levels of education and women with high levels of
education) and the general level of educational attainment in a given country. More
specifically, I analyze the relevance of differential fertility for growth of income per
capita in a cross-section of countries while accounting for direct effects of human
capital. I also examine the possibility that this effect might vary based on the level of
inequality and income. As in De la Croix and Doepke (2003), a higher education-based
fertility differential has an effect on economic growth. However, I find that the direction
of this relationship varies based on a country’s level of development and income
inequality. My results suggest that for a highly unequal country, higher fertility rates of
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women with lower education have a favorable impact on economic development, while
for more equal countries the opposite is true. A higher level of differential fertility
changes the proportion of skilled to unskilled labor in favor of unskilled labor.
Intuitively, since countries that are highly unequal are typically also poor and abundant in
unskilled labor, such an increase in the relative proportion of unskilled labor might have
a favorable effect on growth rates. However, for developed countries with lower
inequality and higher reliance on skilled labor, this relative decrease in the share of skilled
labor could reduce future growth rates.
Is Differential Fertility a Determinant of Regional Economic Growth? A Study of the
U.S.
The transmission and magnitude of the effect of differential fertility on economic
growth are likely to be different at the cross country level compared to the subnational
level. The existing literature has focused exclusively on the cross-country relationship,
thus in the second essay, I explore the relationship between differential fertility and
economic growth in a cross-U.S. state context in order to explicitly identify these
differences. The central question is whether differential fertility is a determinant of
economic growth at the U.S. state level, beyond the combined effects of other variables
affecting economic development. In addition, I test the hypothesis that differential
fertility serves as a channel through which income inequality affects growth. A novel
contribution of this essay is the use of micro-level data to construct a state-level
differential fertility measure for 1970-2000. A nonlinear model, where the relationship
between differential fertility and growth can vary by the level of inequality, suggests that
differential fertility has a negative and statistically significant effect on the average annual
rate of economic growth of most U.S. states, although for a small set of states at the
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beginning of the period under study, differential fertility and growth are positively
correlated. Intuitively, in the cross-country setting, the positive relationship between
differential fertility and growth rates of highly unequal countries can be explained by the
fact that the change in the relative proportion of unskilled labor due to higher differential
fertility increases growth because of these countries’ dependence on unskilled labor.
However, in the U.S. production is more skilled-labor intensive even in states that are
highly unequal and poorer which explains the presence of a negative relationship.
Health Insurance, Fertility, and the Wantedness of Pregnancies: Evidence from
Massachusetts
If changes in differential fertility drive economic activity (De la Croix and
Doepke, 2003; Apostolova-Mihaylova, 2014), understanding the determinants of fertility
for various demographic groups is important for assessing the root causes of economic
growth. The third essay explores the effect of nearly universal health insurance on
fertility rates using the 2007 Massachusetts healthcare reform as a natural experiment.
Since the primary goal of the reform was to mandate and subsidize health care coverage
for all residents of the state, including coverage for birth-related expenses, it provides a
good setting for evaluating the effect of the exogenous provision of health insurance on
the fertility decision. Recognizing that the fertility behavior varies by demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics and that the reform did not affect all residents of the state
equally, this paper explores possible differences in the fertility response based on age,
marital status, and education level. The results suggest that there is no overall fertility
effect, but that there is an economically significant heterogeneous effect by age/marital
status groups where fertility of young single women decreased while fertility of young
married women increased as a result of the reform. These results are consistent with the
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idea that child “wantedness” is higher for married women than for single women. For
married women, the nearly universal access to health insurance promotes fertility, while
single women switch to better contraceptive methods once they gain access to affordable
health insurance. There is no effect on fertility rates of women with different levels of
educational attainment, which implies that providing health insurance coverage does not
affect the education-based fertility gap, at least not in the short run.

4

2. Differential Fertility and Economic Growth: The Role
of Inequality and Human Capital
2.1

Introduction

There is a large literature on how fertility relates to economic growth. In a highly
regarded paper, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) find that differential fertility (the difference
between the fertility rates of women with low levels of education and women with high
levels of education) has a statistically significant, negative effect on economic growth in a
sample of developed and developing countries. I expand on this finding in two ways. First,
de la Croix and Doepke (henceforth DD) do not directly control for a country’s current level
of human capital, implicitly assuming that the effect of human capital on economic growth
occurs entirely through the differential fertility channel. My first contribution is accounting
explicitly for primary school completion rate in a DD-type framework. Second, since
differential fertility matters because educational opportunities differ for children of high- and
low-educated women, it seems plausible that the effect of differential fertility on economic
growth might vary based on a country’s overall level of inequality. For example, it is possible
that in countries where the income distribution is more equal and access to education is
more evenly distributed, the negative effect of differential fertility on economic growth will
be weaker compared to its effect in highly unequal countries. Alternatively, it is also possible
that economic growth in highly unequal countries which rely on unskilled labor might
benefit from larger fertility differentials because of the positive effect on population size. In
either case, the effect of differential fertility on economic growth would depend on a
country’s overall level of inequality. Thus, my second contribution is to investigate how the
relationship between differential fertility and economic growth varies with a country's level
of inequality.
5

My results indicate that income per capita is positively correlated with differential
fertility for high inequality countries. However, the relationship is negative for more
developed countries where income inequality is lower. I also find that differential fertility is
not a robust determinant of economic growth once the current level of human capital is
explicitly accounted for. In section 2.2 I provide a brief review of the literature on inequality,
human capital, and economic growth. Specifics about the data and estimation methodology
are discussed in section 2.3. Results are presented in section 1.44 and robustness checks are
conducted in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2

Literature Review

The literature on the effect of income inequality on economic growth is not
conclusive about the direction or indeed the existence of a causal effect. Some papers find
empirical support for a negative relationship between income inequality and economic
growth (see Table 2.1 for a summary of the literature).
Table 2.1 Summary of the Literature
Author(s)

Year

Direction of
effect
Negative

Persson and
Tabellini

1994

Deininger and
Squire (DS)

1996
1998

No effect

Forbes
Barro
Easterly

2000
2000
2007

Positive
Nonlinear
Negative

Li and Zou

1998

Positive

Inequality
variable
Income share
of top 20%;
Gini
Gini (DS)

Data

Estimation

Comments

Pooled cross
section

OLS
2SLS

Low-quality Gini

Panel

OLS

Gini (DS)
Gini (DS)
Gini (WIDER
2000)

5-year panel
10-year panel
Cross-section

GMM
3SLS
OLS
IV

Gini (DS)

Panel

LSDV
Random
effects

High quality
Cross-country
4 decades
Robust
Reverse causality
Instrument with
agricultural
endowment
Cross-country

For example, in their seminal study, Persson and Tabellini (1994) use pooled crosssectional data from a sample of developed countries and find that income inequality
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(measured as the income share of the top two deciles or a Gini coefficient) has a negative
effect on long-term economic growth in a 2SLS model. Recognizing the need for a reliable
measure of income inequality across countries Deininger and Squire (1996) created higherquality panel dataset on income inequality, which has become a primary source of crosscountry income inequality data. Unlike previously used measures of income inequality,
Deininger and Squire’s Gini coefficient is based on gross income data from individual or
household surveys (not on aggregated national accounts) using representative samples of the
country’s population. In addition to creating a more reliable Gini coefficient, Deininger and
Squire analyze the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. They find a
negative effect that is not robust to the inclusion of regional indicator variables. In the crosscountry analysis of Barro (2000), the negative effect of income inequality on growth is
attained only when fertility is omitted from the growth regression – if fertility is not
controlled for, inequality becomes negatively and significantly related to growth rates. This
suggests that the effect of inequality on economic growth occurs through a fertility channel,
which is the intuition in DD.
Barro (2000) also finds that income levels are an important determinant of income
inequality. He concludes that income inequality has a nonlinear effect on growth rates based
on a country’s level of development: he finds that inequality and growth are negatively
correlated in poorer countries and positively correlated in richer countries. In a crosscountry setting , Easterly (2007) addresses the endogeneity of inequality by using a novel
instrument for the level of inequality - the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat
relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane. His findings support the existence of a
negative linear relationship between inequality and economic development.
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However, other studies have found a positive correlation between inequality and
economic growth. For example, Li and Zou (1998) show in a cross-country panel context
that the correlation is positive when accounting for country fixed effects. In their study,
increased taxation resulting from a more even income distribution affects economic growth
negatively. Similarly, Forbes (2000) uses cross-country panel data to account for timeinvariant country-specific effects and finds that higher inequality is positively correlated with
economic growth in the short run. An important detail in her analysis that is relevant for this
study is the fact that female schooling has a significant and positive effect on growth, even
after controlling for inequality, while male schooling does not.
Several studies have incorporated fertility rates into the inequality-growth
relationship in an effort to combine the demographic, income, and inequality shifts
characterizing the transition to the modern growth regime. Dahan and Tsiddon (1998)
develop a unified growth model that combines observed changes in fertility, the income
distribution, and economic growth rates. They are able to successfully reproduce these
historical shifts in one theoretical framework where subsequent economic growth results
from the rapid accumulation of human capital. Doepke (2004) theoretically examines the
effect of education policies and child labor regulations during the transition to the modern
growth regime on fertility dynamics and the pace of subsequent economic growth. He finds
that the timing of child labor regulations have a larger impact on the level of inequality and
the speed of the demographic transition than the timing of education policies. Moav (2005)
recognizes that parental human capital is a major determinant of child human capital and
theoretically shows that when less-educated parents choose low child “quality” this can lead
to a poverty trap. The study has important policy implications because it recommends
expanded education financing in favor of redistribution policies for decreasing the
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opportunity cost of having a child as a tool to enhance future economic growth. Using the
inverse relationship between fertility rates and income – poorer women (who are typically
less educated) tend to have more children than richer women (who are typically more
educated) - Kremer and Chen (2002) demonstrate empirically that in a country where
income inequality is high, the proportion of low-income/low-educated women increases
over time. As less-educated women tend to have more less-educated children, the lowincome fraction of the population increases faster than the high-income fraction, increasing
inequality further.
DD expand on Kremer and Chen (2002) by introducing the idea of differential
fertility in the inequality-growth relationship. They show that differential fertility has a
negative and statistically significant linear effect on economic growth. In their baseline
model, the effect of income inequality on economic growth is channeled through differential
fertility. More specifically, in a country with high inequality, the fertility rates of women with
low levels of educational attainment are higher than those of women with high levels of
educational attainment due to the inverse relationship between fertility rates and income1.
According to the quantity-quality tradeoff (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and
Tomes 1976; Willis 1973), family income is positively correlated with child quality and
negatively correlated with child quantity. This implies that poorer women will have more
children who are less educated than the children of more educated women who will also
have fewer children. In turn, this reduces growth (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003) based on
the faster-expanding cohort of people with low levels of human capital. DD elaborate on a
model combining differential fertility and income levels developed by Althaus (1980). They
endogenize the fertility decision and parental choice of children’s education. In their model,
1

Education and income are assumed to be highly correlated across countries.
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the education cost per child does not depend on parents’ wages, so it is more costly to
educate a child with lower parental income. The authors also demonstrate empirically that
income inequality matters for growth solely through its effect on differential fertility. The
empirical evidence, in line with the findings of Barro (2000), shows that inequality has no
significant effect on rates of economic growth once the impact of the differential fertility
channel is accounted for, while differential fertility itself has a negative effect on long-run
growth rates.
I consider two modifications of their model.
In the first modification, I analyze the strength and significance of differential
fertility on economic growth while explicitly controlling for level of human capital. There are
several reasons why the level of educational attainment should be accounted for. First, the
role of human capital as a primary determinant of economic growth has been recognized by
many researchers (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Hall and
Jones, 1999 and many others). Second, it is plausible to assume that differential fertility
affects future education levels of a country and would thus matter for future growth but it is
unclear how controlling for differential fertility captures the effect of current education levels
on a country’s growth rate. Thus, augmenting the DD model with human capital allows me
to test more directly the DD hypothesis that differential fertility is the channel through
which education affects growth.
In the second modification I examine potential nonlinearities in the differential
fertility-growth relationship by exploring the possibility that the effect of differential fertility
on economic growth varies based on a country’s level of inequality. It seems plausible that
the effect of differential fertility would be stronger in a country with high inequality, since in
such a country there would presumably be more prominent differences in educational
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opportunities for a poor child compared to a rich child than in a country where the income
distribution is more equal. Another possibility is that larger education-based fertility
differentials will have a favorable impact on economic growth in highly unequal countries
because of the resulting population increase which might contribute to economic growth if a
country is heavily relying on unskilled labor (Galor and Mountford, 2008).

2.3

Data and Methodology

The data are cross-country data covering the period 1960-92, taken from DD2. In
addition to data on income, investment, and other variables typically included in growth
regressions, the DD data include income inequality data from Deininger and Squire (1996)
and data on differential fertility from the World Fertility Survey (WFS) and the Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS)3. The WFS covers 1960-1976 while the DHS covers 1976-1992, so
the two periods I analyze are 1960-76 and 1976-924. Variable definitions are included in
Appendix A.
In the sections that follow, I first investigate whether the effect of differential fertility
is robust to the inclusion of human capital, using the DD estimation methodology.
Throughout this analysis I rely on the two-step GMM estimator5 to analyze the magnitude
and significance of differential fertility after controlling for education. The model is
overidentified so it is appropriate to use the GMM framework instead of instrumental
variables. Subsequently, in Section 4.3, I explore potential nonlinearities in the relationship

I use the corrected DD dataset, which corrects coding errors that appeared in the published version of the
paper. The corrected dataset is available at
http://perso.uclouvain.be/david.delacroix/data/ultimate%20corrected%202008.xlsx
3 The original data were assembled by Kremer and Chen (2002).
4 Fifteen countries have data on differential fertility available for both periods, while 25 have data available only
for the first period, and 25 only for the second period.
5 I am thankful to the authors for sending me their TSP code. Using the two-step GMM estimator provides
results closest to the DD findings.
2
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between differential fertility and economic growth, allowing for a varying effect of
differential fertility on growth based on the level of income inequality. I preserve the DD
framework and estimation methodology in order to obtain comparable results for both
extensions.

2.4

Differential Fertility, Economic Growth, and Human
Capital

2.4.1 Baseline Specification
Following DD I estimate the model below using a two-equation6 GMM estimator:
GROWTHit = β0 + β1 ln(GDPini_t) + β2 I/GDPit + β3 G/GDPit + β4 AFRi + β5 Giniit + β6
ln(TFRit) + β7 ln(DTFRit)

(1)

for country i in period t (t=2 and corresponds to either 1960-1976 or 1976-1992).
The dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP over the period and
the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A.
The first extension to the baseline model that I propose here is to include a measure
of human capital in order to test if an effect of differential fertility on economic growth
exists beyond the direct impact of human capital.
In order to minimize endogeneity, a standard approach in the long-run growth
literature is to use initial levels of explanatory variables in the regression or to use them as
instruments for the average values of these variables. In my baseline regression and
subsequent extensions I use initial levels of the endogenous explanatory variables as

DD estimate this model as a two-equation system with separate equations for each period. All coefficients
except the constant terms are constrained to be equal across the two equations.
6
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instruments for the investment ratio and the share of government spending of GDP.
Appendix A provides details for the instrument set used in this analysis7.
Table 2.2 presents the baseline results which are closely aligned with DD’s findings.
The published DD paper used heteroskedastic errors. However, once the dataset was
corrected, the coefficient on differential fertility was statistically significant only under the
homoscedasticity assumption8. For obtaining baseline results I assume homoscedasticity in
order to align my methodology with that of DD. Since heteroskedasticity is a common issue
for cross-country growth regressions I test the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity using
Whites test (1980, 1982). Although this test could not reject homoscedastic errors, Long and
Ervin (1998) show that tests for heteroskedasticity do not perform well in small samples.
Since heteroskedasticity is a very common problem in growth regressions I operate under
the heteroskedasticity assumption for my subsequent analysis.
The major determinants of economic growth included in the DD specification, have
the usual signs and significance. An increase in initial GDP per capita by 1% results in a
decrease of annual growth rates between 1.3 and 1.5 percentage points. The negative
relationship between initial GDP per capita and subsequent growth rates supports the wellestablished theory that poor economies grow faster than rich ones (β-convergence). As
evidenced by its positive and statistically significant coefficient, a higher investment to GDP
ratio is favorable to growth. On the other hand, higher government spending is detrimental
to GDP growth rates perhaps due to more resources being diverted away from investment
and other growth-enhancing activities. The coefficient estimate on the sub-Saharan Africa
variable is negative and statistically significant. In DD’s theoretical model differential fertility

7
8

I closely follow DD for the selection of the instrument set.
Based on material provided by the authors.
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is a channel for the effect of income inequality on economic growth. Regressions 1.1 and 1.2
provide empirical support for this theoretical argument. In specification 1.1 where a measure
of income inequality is added to the standard growth regression, a more unequal income
distribution is negatively correlated with economic growth. However, income inequality is no
longer statistically significant once differential fertility is directly controlled for (specification
1.2). This provides empirical support to DD’s hypothesis that differential fertility channels
the effect of income inequality on economic growth. The major empirical result in the
second baseline regression is that differential fertility has a statistically significant and
negative effect on economic growth rates. The point estimate implies that increasing the gap
between fertility rates of less-educated and more-educated women from 1 to 2 slows down
growth by an average of 0.76 percentage points per year.
Table 2.2 Baseline Results
Dependent variable:
Growth of GDP/capita
ln(GDP) initial
I/GDP
G/GDP
AFR
Gini

1.1

1.2

-1.348***
(0.254)
0.077***
(0.025)
-0.084***
(0.027)
-2.040***
(0.395)
-0.065***
(0.020)

-1.259***
(0.280)
0.073**
(0.031)
-0.091***
(0.030)
-2.349***
(0.415)
-0.047
(0.036)
1.589
(1.076)
-1.097**
(0.465)
68

ln(TFR) initial
ln(DTFR)
Observations

68

Notes: Significance levels: *** (1%), **(5%), *(10%). Constant term
varies by period (not reported). Homoscedasticity-consistent standard
errors. The instrument set includes: initial GDP per capita, initial

GDP per capita squared, initial investment to GDP ratio, initial
government spending to GDP ratio, initial total fertility rate,
initial total fertility rate squared, life expectancy, life expectancy
squared, indicator variable for Africa, share of land in tropics
and an indicator variable for access to sea.
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2.4.2 Incorporating Human Capital in the Linear Relationship
Although the theoretical growth literature recognizes human capital as a strong
predictor of future economic development, not all measures of human capital are significant
in empirical growth regressions. Barro (2000b) tests several such variables and shows that
only one of them – average years of male secondary and higher schooling – mattered
significantly in his model.
Regressions 2.1 - 2.4 incorporate measures of human capital as an additional
explanatory variable to account directly for the effect of current human capital on growth9. I
use female primary school completion rate for 2.1 and 2.2 and male and female primary
school completion rate for 2.3 and 2.4. I use these variables as a proxy for the current stock
of human capital based on evidence from earlier studies. Barro (1996) found that female
primary school completion rates matter for growth through a reduction in total fertility rates.
Forbes (2000) also finds that female schooling affects growth positively even after
controlling for the level of income inequality.10 The most interesting result is the lack of
statistical significance of differential fertility after the inclusion of human capital. It appears
that differential fertility is not a robust determinant of economic growth because its
coefficient is not statistically significant when I directly control for the current level of
educational attainment (regressions 2.2 and 2.4). For the primary determinants of economic
growth the conclusions from the previous specifications remain largely unchanged. The
magnitudes and signs of these variables are very comparable with the baseline results with

Prior to incorporating human capital I conduct a robustness check to ensure that the baseline results are
consistent with DD’s findings for the subsample of countries for which data on educational attainment exists.
Of the 68 countries in the original sample, three do not appear in the Barro and Lee dataset – Madagascar,
Burkina Faso and Nigeria. My baseline results do not change in a significant way between the 68-country
sample and the 65-country sample. I use the 65-country sample throughout the present analysis.
10 Hanushek and Kimko (2000) explore alternative measures of human capital that better capture the quality of
human capital. They find that the use of these measures improves the explanatory power of standard growth
regressions.
9
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the exception of investment which is no longer statistically significant.11 It is also clear that
these measures of human capital are positively correlated with growth and that this
relationship is robust to the inclusion of total fertility rate and differential fertility, although
their statistical significance decreases in 2.2 and 2.4 respectively. The model predicts that, all
else equal, if female primary school completion rate improves by 10%, average annual
growth rates will increase by 0.2 percentage points.
Table 2.3 Regressions with Human Capital
Dependent variable:
Growth of
GDP/capita
ln(GDP) initial
I/GDP
G/GDP
AFR
PRIMARY F

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

-1.387***
(0.217)
0.010
(0.025)
-0.096***
(0.023)
-2.106***
(0.495)
0.031***
(0.011)

-1.396***
(0.186)
0.014
(0.035)
-0.072***
(0.023)
-2.694***
(0.389)
0.019*
(0.011)

-1.369***
(0.210)
0.010
(0.024)
-0.093***
(0.021)
-2.213***
(0.463)

-1.378***
(0.189)
0.014
(0.036)
-0.076***
(0.022)
-2.632***
(0.394)

0.035**
(0.011)
-0.066***
(0.015)

0.024**
(0.012)
-0.051
(0.034)
0.477
(0.869)
-0.571
(0.411)
65
0.711

PRIMARY MF
Gini

-0.065***
(0.016)

-0.045
(0.034)
ln(TFR) initial
0.475
(0.862)
ln(DTFR)
-0.653
(0.414)
Observations
65
65
65
Hansen’s J-test
0.664
0.678
0.720
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. Constant term
varies by period (not reported). The instrument set includes: initial GDP per capita,
initial GDP per capita squared, initial investment to GDP ratio, initial government
spending to GDP ratio, initial total fertility rate, initial total fertility rate squared,
life expectancy, life expectancy squared, African dummy, share of land in tropics,
access to sea, initial female primary school completion rate, and male and female
primary school completion rates. Hansen’s J-statistic confirms the validity of the
instrument set for all regressions. ***(1%), **(5%), *(10%)
It should be noted that the coefficient on the investment ratio is reduced from 0.07 in Table 2.2 to 0.01 in
Table 2.3 after controlling for human capital. A robustness check confirms that this is not due to the loss of 3
countries in the regressions with human capital – baseline regressions on the 65-country sample produce results
very similar to those of the baseline regressions on the 68-country sample (the coefficient on the investment
ratio in the former case is 0.069 and it is statistically significant at the 5% level while in the latter case it is 0.077
and statistically significant at the 1% level). This is due to the high correlation (0.88) between human capital
(male and female primary school completion rates) and the investment ratio in this sample.
11
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Since it’s not clear whether primary school completion rates are the most appropriate
measure of human capital, in Table 2.4 I substitute other commonly used measures of
human capital as a robustness check. I replace male and female primary school completion
rates in specification 2.4 with four other measures of human capital – average years of
schooling (male and female; female) and secondary school completion rate (male and female;
female). Regardless of the chosen measure the coefficient on differential fertility is not
statistically significant, providing additional evidence that differential fertility is not a robust
determinant of economic growth. This is likely not due to a multicollinearity issue between
those measures of human capital and differential fertility because in all instances where the
standard errors increase after the inclusion of the education measure, the change of the
coefficients of differential fertility is markedly larger than the increase in the standard errors
when compared to regression 1.2. Furthermore, as Table 2.5 shows, the correlation between
all six measures of human capital and differential fertility is fairly small which confirms that
multicollinearity is not a severe problem in this model.
My results suggest that earlier empirical findings regarding the role of differential
fertility for long-run economic growth change when the model is extended to directly
account for the current level of human capital. In the next section I test the existence of a
nonlinear effect of differential fertility on economic growth.
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Table 2.4 Regressions with Other Measures of Human Capital
Dependent variable:
Growth of
GDP/capita
ln(GDP) initial

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

-1.304***
-1.276***
-1.067***
-1.054***
(0.299)
(0.294)
(0.323)
(0.300)
I/GDP
0.052
0.056
0.075*
0.071
(0.039)
(0.039)
(0.045)
(0.044)
G/GDP
-0.085***
-0.090***
-0.105***
-0.101***
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.029)
(0.028)
AFR
-2.624***
-2.600***
-2.439***
-2.454***
(0.453)
(0.453)
(0.490)
(0.480)
Human Capital
0.048
0.036
-0.008
-0.014
(0.111)
(0.110)
(0.024)
(0.023)
Gini
-0.076*
-0.080**
-0.105***
-0.100**
(0.040)
(0.037)
(0.041)
(0.042)
ln(TFR) initial
0.409
0.330
0.610
0.517
(1.106)
(1.053)
(1.170)
(1.130)
ln(DTFR)
-0.262
-0.163
0.016
-0.011
(0.375)
(0.350)
(0.428)
(0.451)
Observations
65
65
65
65
Hansen’s J-test
0.780
0.814
0.953
0.933
Human capital
AYSCHOOL AYSCHOOL SSCHOOL SSCHOOL
measure
(F)
(MF)
(F)
(MF)
Notes: Initial measures of human capital based on the respective regression
replace initial primary school completion rates and male and female primary
school completion rates to the instrument set. See Table 2.3 for additional notes.

Table 2.5 Correlation Coefficients
ln(DTFR)

2.5

AYSCHOOL
MF

AYSCHOOL
F

SSCHOOL
MF

SSCHOOL
F

PRIMARY
MF

PRIMARY
F

-0.47

-0.40

-0.32

-0.27

-0.44

-0.45

Nonlinearities in the Differential Fertility – Growth
Relationship

The argument in the original DD analysis focuses on differential fertility as a channel
through which income inequality affects economic growth. However, it seems probable that
this negative effect of larger education-based fertility differentials is weaker in less unequal
countries where education access and quality is more likely to be evenly distributed across
the population. The effect of differential fertility could actually be positive for a highly
unequal, poor country heavily relying on unskilled labor where future growth of the unskilled
labor share (resulting from higher differential fertility) would have a favorable effect on
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growth rates. In order to investigate such a possibility, I allow the effects of differential
fertility on growth to vary based on a country’s level of inequality.
The empirical model is now
GROWTHit = β0 + β1 ln(GDPini_t) + β2 I/GDPit + β3 G/GDPit + β4 AFRi + β5 Giniit +β6
ln(TFRit) + β7 ln(DTFRit) + β8 HKit + β9 ln(DTFR)it x Giniit + εit

(2)

for country i in period t (t=2 and corresponds to either 1960-1976 or 1976-1992).
The dependent variable is the average growth rate of per capita GDP over the respective
period and the explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. In this model, the
nonlinearity in the differential fertility-economic growth relationship is represented by an
interaction term. Here the nonlinear effect of differential fertility on economic growth is
measured by:
β7 + β9 x Gini
I add different measures of educational attainment to this baseline specification to
check the robustness of the nonlinear effect. The results from this extension provide several
interesting insights.
First, differential fertility appears to be strongly correlated with growth through its
statistically significant nonlinear effect even after the inclusion of a human capital variable.
This finding is in stark contrast with the lack of statistical significance in the linear model
once human capital was accounted for.
Second, this result is consistent across several different measures of human capital –
regressions 5.1 and 5.2 use primary school completion rates (for females, and for males and
females respectively), and regressions 5.3 and 5.4 use average years of schooling (for females,

19

and for males and females respectively). In all cases the magnitude and sign of the
coefficients on differential fertility are comparable.
Third, these results confirm that the effect of differential fertility varies based on the
overall level of income inequality. In countries with low level of inequality, an increase in the
education-based fertility gap slows down economic growth. In contrast, for countries with
high levels of income inequality, economic development can benefit from an increase in
differential fertility. The turning point of income inequality in regression 5.1 corresponds to
a Gini coefficient of approximately 43.4. Countries with Gini coefficient lower than this
threshold experience a reduction in average annual growth rates as a result of increasing
differential fertility while countries with inequality levels at the high end of the inequality
spectrum would be impacted positively by a similar increase in differential fertility. For
example, in a low-inequality country like Norway where the coefficient on income inequality
was 37.5 between 1960 and 1976, an increase in differential fertility from 1 to 2 would lead
to an average reduction of its annual growth rate of approximately 0.7 percentage points.
However, a high-inequality country like Lesotho, with an index of income inequality of 56.02
in the same period, would experience a higher annual growth rate of about 0.8 percentage
points as a result of increasing the fertility gap from 1 to 2 children. It should be noted that
in reality differential fertility experienced an overall decrease between the two periods. For
countries which appear in both subsamples, differential fertility was reduced from 3.02 in
1960-1976 to 2.40 in 1976-1992. By using the results from regression 5.3 I estimate that for
the average country in this subsample where the mean Gini coefficient is 49.26, average
annual growth rates were reduced by 0.02 percentage points per year as a result of the actual
reduction in differential fertility. Table 2.7 provides a comparison of the effects from the
linear and nonlinear models. In this table the estimated effects are based on the actual decrease
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in differential fertility between the two periods. I conclude that the observed reduction in the
education-based fertility gap has helped countries with more equal income distributions and
has harmed countries where income inequality is high.
Table 2.6 Regressions with Nonlinearities
Dependent
variable:
Growth of
GDP/capita
ln(GDP) initial

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

-1.475***
-1.483***
-1.124***
-1.251***
(0.312)
(0.316)
(0.332)
(0.346)
I/GDP
0.063
0.068
0.116**
0.105**
(0.062)
(0.068)
(0.049)
(0.049)
G/GDP
-0.046
-0.045
-0.067**
-0.053*
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.027)
(0.028)
AFR
-2.430***
-2.218***
-2.336***
-2.335***
(0.506)
(0.554)
(0.586)
(0.552)
Human Capital
0.016
0.017
0.184
-0.135
(0.025)
(0.028)
(0.132)
(0.153)
Gini
-0.100
-0.118
-0.158**
-0.169**
(0.077)
(0.084)
(0.071)
(0.073)
ln(TFR) initial
0.952
1.016
1.743
-1.319
(1.505)
(1.636)
(1.383)
(1.373)
ln(DTFR)
-5.280*
-6.132**
-5.706**
-6.635**
(2.719)
(2.898)
(2.743)
(2.702)
ln(DTFR)*Gini
0.115*
0.135**
0.118*
0.143**
(0.068)
(0.073)
(0.063)
(0.064)
Observations
65
65
65
65
Hansen’s J-test
0.990
0.992
0.842
0.847
Human capital
PRIMARY PRIMARY AYSCHOOL AYSCHOOL
measure
F
MF
F
MF
Notes: The interaction term is assumed to be endogenous. Life expectancy
squared multiplied by the share of a country’s land in the tropics is used as an
additional instrument. See Table 2.3 for additional notes.

One possible explanation for the direction of the marginal effects could be
differences in the production function based on a country’s level of development. In general,
countries where income inequality is high rely more on unskilled labor relative to countries
with low levels of inequality where skilled labor is more abundant. Thus, an increase in the
education-based fertility gap in countries of the first type would be favorable to growth
because of the productivity gains associated with the increased size of the main factor of
production. Conversely, this would hurt low-inequality countries where higher differential
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fertility implies a reduction of the relative share of skilled labor and a negative effect on
growth.
Table 2.7 Estimated Effects of the Actual Decrease in Differential Fertility
Nonlinear effect
Specification (3)
75th pctl
50th pctl
25th pctl
Gini
Gini
Gini
51.9
45.4
36.7
Growth effect
0.252
-0.201
0.001
0.408
Marginal effect
-1.097**
0.874**
-0.003
-1.775**
Standard error
(0.465)
(0.370)
(0.699)
(0.551)
Notes: This table compares the effect of differential fertility on average annual
growth rates at different levels of income inequality using the actual reduction
in differential fertility for countries in both periods. The estimated linear effect
is based on baseline regression 1.2. The estimated nonlinear effect is based on
regression 5.2. For countries with observations in both periods differential
fertility decreased from 3.02 in 1960-1976 to 2.40 in 1976-1992.
Linear effect
Specification
(1)

2.6

Robustness Checks

In this section, I undertake several robustness checks. First, I split the sample based
on the median level of income inequality and run the baseline specification augmented with
male and female primary school completion rates (regression 2.4). This allows me to check
my findings beyond the suitability of the instruments for the interaction term in the
nonlinear case. Appendix A details data availability for each country by period. I run
regression 2.4 separately for the low-inequality and high-inequality sample.
Second, in order to test if the nonlinear effect is also related to the income level I
split the sample by income level and run specification 2.4 separately for the low-income and
high-income samples. This allows me to test indirectly whether the effect of differential
fertility varies based on a country’s level of GDP per capita.

2.6.1 Split Samples by Income Inequality
The robustness check based on the split samples provides additional evidence for the
existence of a nonlinear effect. Table 2.8 reports results for countries with high and low
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coefficients of inequality. I split the sample based on the median of the two-period average
level of income inequality12. I confirm that countries where the income distribution is more
unequal have experienced a reduction in average GDP per capita growth rates in the order of
0.11 percentage points per year due to the decrease in the education-based fertility gap13
from 1960-1976 to 1976-1992 (regressions 7.1 and 7.2). The magnitude of the effect is very
similar to the result based on the full sample where the effect of the actual reduction in
differential fertility for highly unequal countries was -0.10. The robustness check for the lowinequality sample does not support findings from the previous section since the coefficient
on differential fertility is not statistically significant. However, the lack of statistical
significance provides an interesting insight that is consistent with an asymmetric effect of
differential fertility where its effect matters for highly unequal countries but is significantly
attenuated for more equal countries. There are at least two reasons why this could be true.
First, low-educated women in more equal countries are generally more educated, in relative
terms, due to more equal access to education. Second, they have lower fertility rates as a
result of the quantity-quality tradeoff than their counterparts in highly unequal countries.
This combination of lower fertility rates and higher human capital has two implications.
First, their children will be more educated than children of low-educated mothers in more
unequal countries. Second, the share of low-educated population will not increase over time
as fast as it would in less equal countries. As a result, in countries with lower levels of
income inequality any deterioration of the human capital base resulting from higher
differential fertility will be slower and less pronounced than in more unequal countries.

12
13

The median two-period average coefficient of income inequality is 43.
Differential fertility in the high-inequality sample decreased from 2.97 in 1960-1976 to 2.67 in 1976-1992.
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Table 2.8 Split Sample Regressions by Income Inequality
Dependent variable:
Growth of GDP/capita
ln(GDP) initial
I/GDP
G/GDP
AFR
Human Capital
Gini
ln(TFR) initial
ln(DTFR)
Observations
Hansen’s J-test
Notes: See Table 2.3.

7.1
High
inequality
-2.106***
(0.476)
0.133***
(0.034)
-210***
(0.034)
1.284**
(0.587)
0.110***
(0.018)
-0.103***
(0.023)
-1.196
(1.193)
1.028*
(0.567)
34
0.841

7.2
Low
inequality
-1.601***
(0.168)
0.056*
(0.030)
-0.093***
(0.022)
-4.401***
(0.276)
0.010
(0.08)
-0.051**
(0.022)
-0.333
(0.795)
0.336
(0.262)
35
0.575

2.6.2 Split Samples by Income Level
Second, in order to test the theory that the nonlinear effect of differential fertility
might be related to the level of income per capita, I split the sample by the median income
level and run specification 2.4 separately for the low-income and high-income samples. This
would be consistent with the theory that unskilled labor-abundant countries which specialize
in unskilled labor-intensive production experience productivity gains related to the increase
in the relative share of their primary resource as a result of the increases in differential
fertility. For example, if unskilled labor has a larger share in a country’s production function,
increases in differential fertility will expand the unskilled-labor base and help promote
growth. On the other hand, for richer countries which rely heavily on skilled-labor14, an
increase in differential fertility will decrease the share of skilled-labor in the population and
slow down future economic growth.

14

I assume that unskilled-labor abundant countries are relatively poorer than skilled-labor abundant countries.
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I split the sample based on the median GDP per capita15 and run specification 2.4
separately on the low-income and high-income samples. Results are reported in Table 2.9. I
find partial evidence in favor of a nonlinear effect related to level of income per capita.
Specifically, the coefficient of differential fertility in regression 8.1 is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level for countries in the low-GDP sample. Even though the effect
based on the GDP sample split is lower than the effect based on the inequality sample split
(0.50 vs 1.03), this confirms my findings for the sample of poorer countries. However, the
result is not robust with respect to the high-GDP sample where the coefficient on
differential fertility has the correct sign but lacks statistical significance.
Table 2.9 Split Sample Regressions by GDP Per Capita
Dependent variable:
Growth of GDP /capita
ln(GDP) initial
I/GDP
G/GDP
AFR
MFPRIMARY
GINI
ln(TFR) initial
ln(DTFR)
Observations

8.1
Low GDP

8.2
High GDP

-0.748
(0.692)
-0.042
(0.270)
-0.218***
(0.40)
-2.326***
(0.594)
0.082***
(0.014)
0.030
(0.021)
-2.140***
(0.535)
0.496***
(0.145)
33

-2.104***
(0.295)
0.034
(0.025)
-0.139***
(0.044)
-0.915
(0.673)
-0.003
(0.013)
-0.016
(0.038)
-1.554*
(0.821)
-0.457
(0.517)
32

0.503

0.510

Hansen’s J statistic

Notes: See Table 2.3.

15

The median GDP/capita is $1,458.
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2.7

Concluding Remarks

In this study I expand the framework of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) who
previously found that differential fertility (the difference in fertility rates of women with low
levels of educational attainment and women with high levels of educational attainment)
matters for economic growth. I extend their work in two ways. First, I introduce human
capital in a standard growth regression to directly account for the effect of the current level of
human capital on economic growth since human capital has been widely recognized as one
of its primary determinants. Second, I analyze the possibility for marginal effects that vary
based on the level of income inequality and GDP per capita because it is plausible to assume
that the effect of differential fertility might be different for countries with different income
distributions.
I find that directly including a measure of human capital is important for assessing
the effect of differential fertility on economic growth because the statistical significance of
this effect disappears under the common linearity assumption once the effect of human
capital is directly accounted for. However, when I allow the effect of differential fertility on
economic growth to vary based on the level of income inequality and GDP per capita, I find
some evidence that poor and more unequal countries tend to benefit from increases in
differential fertility while countries with lower levels of income inequality are affected
negatively by a larger education-based fertility spread even after directly controlling for
human capital in the growth regression.

Copyright © Maria Apostolova-Mihaylova 2014
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3. Is Differential Fertility a Determinant of Regional
Economic Growth? A Study of the U.S.
3.1

Introduction

The empirical literature has recognized income inequality as an important factor
affecting economic growth, but its exact effect is a source of controversy. Some authors find
a positive relationship between income inequality and the rate of economic growth in the
cross-country context (Li and Zou, 1998 and Forbes, 2000), while others find the opposite
result (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Deininger and Squire, 1996; Barro, 2000). Combining the
literature on the demographic effects of income inequality and the cross-country growth
literature, De la Croix and Doepke (2003)16 analyze the effects of differential fertility (the
difference between the total fertility rate17 of women with low level of education and women
with high level of education) and income inequality on rates of economic growth. Using
cross-country data, they find that the negative effect of income inequality on growth is
channeled through differential fertility which affects the aggregate level of human capital in a
country. In an extension of their work Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) shows that this effect is
not robust in a human-capital augmented growth regression, but that there is a possible
nonlinear effect. She finds that economic growth rates of countries with low levels of
income inequality are favorably affected by increases in differential fertility while growth
rates of more equal countries are negatively correlated with higher differential fertility.
While the cross-country growth literature has examined differential fertility as a
determinant of growth rates, to my knowledge there are no attempts to test the relationship
Henceforth DD.
Total fertility rate is the total number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the
end of her child-bearing years and give birth to children in agreement with the prevailing age-specific fertility
rates. See http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/factbook-2013en/01/01/02/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-2-en (accessed on 04/23/2014).

16
17
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within a country. I examine this relationship among U.S. states and contribute to the existing
literature in two ways. First, I construct a state-level measure of differential fertility using
individual-level data from the Decennial Census and the CPS. Second, using the variation in
income inequality and differential fertility across U.S. states, I explore whether the nonlinear
relationship between these variables and economic growth observed at the cross-country
level also holds at the state level.
There are many advantages to using U.S. state-level data as opposed to cross-country
data. Cross-country data for most variables typically used in a neoclassical growth framework
are available at either annual or quinquennial form but data on differential fertility are limited
to a relatively small group of countries at irregular and inconsistent time intervals. Due to the
great variation across countries, cross-country data are richer but also prone to measurement
error. In contrast, data for the United States are much more frequent and more reliable. The
high frequency of state-level data broadens the set of possible estimation techniques that can
be used to account for temporal dynamics and state-specific unobserved factors affecting
economic development. A disadvantage of state-level data is that there is less variation in
income inequality across states than across countries. However, the same is true for
observable and unobservable variables, allowing for better identification of the primary
drivers of economic growth in a cross-state analysis.
I hypothesize that the cross-country nonlinearity does not hold in the U.S. case.
Intuitively, combining the results of Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) and the theoretical model
of Galor and Mountford (2008) the positive effect of increases in differential fertility on
growth rates of highly unequal countries could be explained by the fact that since highly
unequal countries typically rely more on unskilled labor, higher differential fertility leads to
an increase in the relative proportion of unskilled labor, which is the main production factor
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in those countries. In contrast, for countries with a more equal income distribution, the
increase in differential fertility will lead to a reduction of the relative share of the more
productive skilled labor, which will negatively affect the rates of future economic growth in
those countries.18 Thus, it is reasonable to believe that for the U.S., where income inequality
is lower19 and the dependence on skilled labor is significantly higher compared to other
countries (Appendix 2.D, Figure 2), the relationship between increases in differential fertility
and economic growth is linear and negative because an increase in differential fertility would
lower the proportion of skilled labor in the population which will then lower subsequent
growth. In section 2, I survey the literature on the effect of inequality and demographics on
economic growth at the cross-country and at the cross-state level. Section 3 discusses the
construction of the differential fertility variable for the United States as well as other data
used in this analysis. I present the empirical estimation and results in section 4 and conduct
robustness checks in section 5. Section 6 concludes.

3.2

Review of the Literature

3.2.1 Income Inequality and Economic Growth at the Cross-Country
Level
Although there is a large literature examining the effect of income inequality on
economic growth, there is hardly a consensus about the direction of this effect at either the
cross-country level or at the state level. Early cross-country studies by Persson and Tabellini

Using educational attainment as a proxy for skill level, Figure 1 in Appendix 2.D presents the percentage of
the population 15 years and over with completed tertiary education for a sample of countries by level of
income inequality. Countries that are more unequal like Botswana, Brazil, and Kenya, have a smaller relative
share of highly-skilled workers compared to countries with lower levels of income inequality, like Norway,
Finland, and Spain.
19 While wealth inequality in the U.S. has increased dramatically over time, income inequality in the U.S. is
much lower than in other countries. See http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014Slides.pdf (accessed
on 05/07/2014) and http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-data/11944-wealthdistribution-income-inequality.html#axzz312wdXvRJ (accessed on 05/07/2014).
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(1994) and Deininger and Squire (1996) find evidence for a negative relationship. Barro
(2000) hypothesizes that income inequality affects growth rates of poor and rich countries in
different ways and finds empirical evidence for a nonlinear effect - a more unequal income
distribution slows down growth rates of poor countries and speeds up growth rates of richer
economies. Easterly (2007) recognizes the potential endogeneity of income inequality and
uses instrumental variable estimation where the abundance of land suitable for growing
wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane is a novel instrument. He also finds that
inequality and economic development are negatively correlated.
Other cross-country studies that use panel data and account for country fixed effects, like Li
et al. (1998) and Forbes (2000), find that income inequality has a positive effect on growth
rates.
Several cross-country studies have suggested that income inequality might have an
indirect, rather than a direct, effect on economic growth. More specifically, there is a
literature that examines the interaction between differential fertility and economic growth by
emphasizing the role of income inequality in that relationship. An early study by Kremer and
Chen (2002) provides empirical support relating income inequality to future demographic
dynamics. They find that in countries with a more unequal income distribution, the
proportion of poor and low educated women grows over time. The basic assumption is that
given some degree of intergenerational persistence of human capital, the children born to
less-educated women will also be relatively less educated, so the fraction of the population
with less education will increase over time. DD use this idea to link income inequality and
economic growth through the differential fertility channel. They show theoretically that an
increase in differential fertility leads to a reduction of the future aggregate level of human
capital in a given country, which will, in turn, lower the rate of economic growth. They also
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demonstrate empirically that income inequality does not matter for growth once differential
fertility is accounted for. Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) augments the DD growth regression
with a measure of contemporaneous human capital, which is a well-established determinant
of economic growth. Her findings suggest that the linear relationship between differential
fertility and economic growth is not robust to the inclusion of various measures of human
capital and that these variables could be related in a nonlinear way where highly unequal
countries benefit from increases in differential fertility while growth rates of less unequal
countries are affected negatively.

3.2.2 Income Inequality and Economic Growth at the State Level
The research on inequality and economic growth at the state level was spurred by the
seminal cross-country study of Persson and Tabellini (1994). The studies that I survey below
illustrate the lack of conclusive results and the apparent dependence of the results on the
methodological approach taken. Persson and Tabellini (1994) use two cross-country datasets
from different periods and find evidence in support of their theoretical prediction that with
higher income inequality, the political process does not favor long-run economic growth
because of a distorted redistribution mechanism. Partridge (1997) responds to this study by
analyzing the effect of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient and middle
quintile income share derived from survey data) on U.S. state-level economic growth
between 1960 and 1990. He uses several different models to test Persson and Tabellini’s
theory of a negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth and the
dependence of future growth on the median voter income share. Results from pooled OLS
and instrumental variable estimation show that higher initial income inequality (measured by
the Gini coefficient) has a positive and statistically significant effect on subsequent economic
growth, even accounting for the correlation between past and future economic activity,
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government policies, and state-specific industrial composition. He finds the opposite result
when using the median quintile share of income as an alternative measure of income
inequality - increasing the income share of the middle class (lower income inequality) has a
favorable effect on growth rates. By using earlier data and different sources and
methodologies, Panizza (2002) overturns Partridge’s conclusion to some degree. His analysis
focuses on U.S. state-level growth rates between 1940 and 1980. He relies on measures of
income inequality (Gini coefficient and income share of the third quintile) that are based on
income data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which are more accurate than survey
data. Using the fixed-effects estimator he finds evidence of a negative relationship between
income inequality and growth. Panizza’s main result is that the Gini coefficient appears to be
the more robust measure of income inequality that remains negatively and statistically
significantly related to growth rates regardless of the type of estimation procedure. In an
effort to reconcile the conflicting findings in the state-level literature, Partridge (2005)
separates the short-term from the long-term effects of income inequality on economic
growth. He analyzes the 1960 – 2000 period using Decennial Census data as the source of
income inequality measures. He argues that the relationship between the income distribution
and economic growth is complex and cannot be captured by a single variable. Since the Gini
coefficient and the third quintile income share reflect different aspects of that relationship he
includes both in the same specification. To test the long-run relationship between income
inequality and growth, he uses pooled OLS with regional dummy variables and finds
evidence for a positive relationship. For assessing the short-run effects, Partridge suggests
using the fixed effects estimator because it relies on within-state variation to explain changes
in the dependent variable over time. Similar to Panizza, he observes that with a fixed effects
model, the sign and statistical significance are highly sensitive to whether initial income per
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capita is represented in its log or level form. Frank (2009) constructs a new set of income
inequality measures for 1945-2004 that are based on IRS data. These measures include the
top 1% income share, the top decile income share, the Atkinson Index, and the Theil
Entropy Index.20 Another notable feature of this dataset is its time dimension – earlier
studies typically measure income inequality at 10 year-intervals based on the Decennial
Census, but Frank (2009) calculates them annually. Due to the low-income reporting cutoff
for filing tax returns those measures are truncated so the author uses the top decile income
share to analyze the effect of income inequality on economic growth. Using several different
estimators, he finds that higher income inequality increases growth rates. Spurred by these
conflicting and often inconclusive results, several recent studies test for a nonlinear
relationship between inequality and growth at the U.S state level. For example, Hasanov and
Izraeli (2011) test for three types of nonlinearities. They introduce Gini squared as an
explanatory variable and find that the relationship between the Gini coefficient and income
growth has an inverted U shape, such that extreme income inequality affects state growth
rates negatively, while the opposite is true for moderate levels of income inequality. The
authors also test for an interaction effect with income levels and find, similar to Barro
(2000), that higher income inequality supports growth in states with higher income. When
the change in income inequality is introduced in the regression, it appears that economic
growth slows down when inequality decreases and when it increases beyond a certain level.

3.2.3 Income Inequality, Demographic Dynamics, and Economic
Growth
To date, the state-level growth literature has not factored in the correlation between
income inequality and differential fertility proposed by Kremer and Chen (2002) like DD did
I return to these measures in section 6. See Appendix A for a complete description of the Atkinson index
and the Theil Entropy Index.
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at the cross-country level. However, several studies have included demographic dynamics as
a determinant of sub-national and regional growth rates. For example, Glaeser et al. (1995)
explore the role of initial urban characteristics in 1960 in the evolution of growth rates of
population and income for U.S. cities. They analyze the effects of population levels and
growth rates on income growth over a 30-year period. They find that city income growth
depends on initial values of manufacturing share, unemployment rate, per capita income, and
the region where the city is located, but not on the initial population size or its subsequent
growth. In order to analyze the effect of human capital on national and regional rates of
economic growth, Gennaioli et al. (2013) construct a dataset of 1,569 regions from 110
countries. They test for scale effects in regional externalities by including the log of
population as an explanatory variable in the growth regression. They find that a larger
population has a beneficial effect on regional economic growth.
While the cross-state literature focuses on how overall population growth matters for
growth, I am interested in examining how fertility differences between certain groups might
affect income inequality and growth. Fertility differences by mother’s education level could
matter in at least two ways for state-level growth. First, if the proportion of low-income
people is significantly larger than the proportion of high-income people (as a result of high
inequality), children of low-educated parents are also relatively low-educated and outnumber
the children born to more highly educated parents.21 As a result, the future aggregate level of
human capital will decrease because it is a weighted average of the human capital of loweducated and high-educated people. Given that poor people, who are typically less educated,
tend to migrate less (Basker, 2003; Ott et al., 2011), one might expect that in a state where

This is due to the quantity-quality tradeoff introduced by Becker and Lewis (1974), which is the idea that if
people have few children, those children are likely to be more educated while if people have more children,
they are likely to be less educated.
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the education-based fertility gap increases, the resulting lower aggregate level of human
capital will reduce future growth rates. Second, it is also possible that there exists a nonlinear
effect related to the level of income inequality where increases in differential fertility in less
unequal states have a smaller effect on future growth rates, because educational
opportunities are similar for all children, while in more unequal states growth rates could
decrease.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between income inequality and economic
growth among U.S. states, particularly focusing on the potential role of differential fertility.
Using the Decennial Census and the CPS June supplement survey data I construct a panel
dataset of state-level differential fertility rates reflecting differences in total fertility rate by
educational attainment of the mother for 1960-2009. A detailed explanation of the
construction of this variable is included in the following section.

3.3

Data

3.3.1 Variables
The data are cross-state covering 40 years from 1970 until 2009. I use the data as a
cross section and as a panel (four 10-year periods and two 20-year periods). I drop Alaska,
Hawaii, and the District of Columbia from the analysis resulting in 48 observations per time
period but do include a robustness check with Alaska and Hawaii. For the set of control
variables I follow Panizza (2002). Summary statistics for selected variables over the entire
period and for each 10-year and 20-year period are included in Appendix B. All variables
except growth rates are measured at the beginning of each period. The growth rate of
personal income (݃ )ݎis measured as the average annual growth rate during a 10-year period
or a 20-year period, depending on the specification. Data on nominal personal income per
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capita come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. I use the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Price Index for 2009 (CPI) to adjust nominal variables for inflation and obtain
real per capita personal income ()ݕ. In the spirit of the human capital-augmented neoclassical
growth model I include the percent of the population with completed college or higher
(ܿ )݈݈݁݃݁or the percent of the population with completed high school (݄ )ݏto account for
the effect of human capital on economic growth. The Population Census is the source for
data on educational attainment. A measure of the percentage of the population aged 65 and
over (ݎ݁ݒͷ) is used to control for the state-specific age composition. I also include the
fraction of the population living in urban areas ( )ܾ݊ܽݎݑto account for the urban/rural
makeup. I include several measures of income inequality constructed by Frank (2009).22 For
my main analysis I use the Gini coefficient (݃݅݊݅)23 but as a robustness check I consider
alternative measures of income inequality in section 5.24 I also include a measure of the birth
rate, which comes from the Natality Volume of the Vital Statistics of the United States for
1970 and 1980 and the National Vital Statistics Reports for 1990 and 2000. In all fixed
effects specifications I use decade dummy variables to capture the time-varying
characteristics of the growth process. The specification does not include a measure of
interstate migration. I exclude this variable because interstate migration is likely to be
endogenous in a state-level growth regression under the assumption that migration is
economically induced. An alternative would be to use instrumental variables to overcome the
endogeneity problem. However, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) show that with this
approach the effect of migration on state-level growth is statistically insignificant. Moreover,
22

Frank (2009) created a high frequency income inequality dataset for the U.S. states. His main contribution is
the use of annual IRS income data while the typical source for the calculation of income inequality measures
that is used by the literature is survey data.
23 Frank’s calculation of the Gini coefficient uses individual adjusted pre-tax income as the income measure.
Adjusted gross income includes wages, interest, dividends, business income and rental income.
24 For a detailed description of inequality measures, see Appendix A.
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the interstate migration rate25 ranges between 1.6 and 3 percent for most of the period under
study (Molloy et al., 2011) so I argue that its effect on growth is likely to be minimal.
Although state-level data have many advantages over cross-country data, one
potentially problematic aspect is their limited variation. Table 3.1 presents a comparison
between the variation of the cross-state sample and the DD cross-country sample for the
Gini coefficient and differential fertility. As expected, the cross-state sample shows less
variability. The coefficient of variation (C.V.) of the Gini coefficient ranges between 0.04
and 0.11 for the cross-state sample compared to 0.23 for the cross-country sample.
Differential fertility exhibits more variation at the cross-state level with a C.V. of 0.09 to
0.39. This is more than half the C.V. for differential fertility in DD’s cross-country sample.
Table 3.1 Variation of Gini and Differential Fertility
U.S. States vs. DD Cross-country sample
݃݅݊݅
Min.
Max.
Mean
St. Dev.
Coefficient of Variation

1970
0.42
0.51
0.46
0.019
0.04

1980
0.45
0.55
0.49
0.019
0.04

1990
0.53
0.62
0.56
0.020
0.04

25

2000 1970-2000
0.53
0.42
0.66
0.66
0.58
0.52
0.031
0.057
0.05
0.11

1960-1992
0.23
0.69
0.45
0.103
0.23

2000 1970-2000
0.26
0.26
1.82
2.19
1.02
1.33
0.399
0.399
0.39
0.30

Cross-country
DD
1960-1992
0.10
5.30
2.32
1.287
0.55

U.S. States

݂݂݀݅݁ݕݐ݈݅݅ݐݎ݂݈݁ܽ݅ݐ݊݁ݎ
Min.
Max.
Mean
St. Dev.
Coefficient of Variation

Cross-country
DD

U.S. States

1970
0.11
2.19
1.75
0.255
0.15

1980
1.05
1.7
1.47
0.139
0.09

1990
0.51
1.41
1.07
0.191
0.18

Interstate migration is defined as the percentage of people who lived in a different state one year ago.
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3.3.2 Construction of the Differential Fertility Variable
A novel feature of this paper is the construction of a state-level differential fertility
variable similar to the cross-country differential fertility variable used by DD. Differential
fertility is defined as the difference between fertility rates of women with low levels of
education and fertility rates of women with high levels of education. Unlike the DD crosscountry study where the definitions of high and low level of education vary by country based
on the particulars of the surveys used, here these definitions are consistent for all states. I
define “less educated” women as having completed high school or less, while “more
educated” refers to women with at least a college degree. In order to calculate differential
fertility by state I combine micro-level data on educational attainment with data on total
fertility rate. For the years 1970, 1980, and 1990 I use data from the Decennial Census
because it contains questions about educational attainment and children ever born (total
fertility rate). I am unable to use the 2000 Decennial Census because the 1990 Census was
the last one to include a question about the number of children ever born to a woman. For
the year 2000 this information can be found in the June 2000 supplement of the CPS which
contains data on fertility. I use sampling weights to obtain population-weighted total fertility
rates by education level for each state. For the start year of each period I begin by restricting
the sample to women with completed high school or less (less-educated women), who are 15
to 44 years old. I then weigh the ݄݈ܿ݅݀ ݊ݎܾݎ݁ݒ݁݊݁ݎvariable for each observation by the
observation’s sampling weight in order to account for the probability of selection. Thus, I
obtain a state-level aggregated total fertility rate for less-educated women of child-bearing
age. I then restrict the sample to women of child-bearing age with completed college or
more (more educated women). Using the procedure described above I obtain a state-level
aggregated total fertility rate for more educated women of child-bearing age. The final step is
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to subtract the total fertility rate of more educated women from the total fertility rate of lesseducated women for each state to obtain a state-level aggregate measure of differential
fertility for the first year in each period. Appendix C shows the trends in differential fertility
over 1970-2000 by state.

3.4

Empirical Methodology

The focus of this paper is to empirically investigate the relationship between
differential fertility and the rate of economic growth at the U.S. state level. Since
Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) demonstrated that this relationship could exhibit nonlinearities
at the cross-country level, I also explore the possibility for a heterogeneous effect in the U.S.
based on the level of income inequality. I use two main empirical specifications, which allow
for both a linear and a non-linear effect. I estimate a state-level human-capital augmented
growth model following Panizza (2002) to which I add differential fertility.
I estimate the following two models:
ଵ

ቀ ቁ ൫൫ݕǡ௧ା ൯ െ ൫ݕǡ௧ ൯൯ ൌ ߚଵ ൫ݕǡ௧ ൯   ߚଶ ݃݅݊݅ǡ௧  ߚଷ ݀ݎ݂ݐǡ௧  ߚସ ܺǡ௧  ߙ  ߛ௧  ߝǡ௧
୲

(1)
ଵ

ቀ ቁ ൫൫ݕǡ௧ା ൯ െ ൫ݕǡ௧ ൯൯ ൌ ߚଵ ൫ݕǡ௧ ൯   ߚଶ ݃݅݊݅ǡ௧  ߚଷ ݀ݎ݂ݐǡ௧  ߚସ ݀݅݊݅݃ܺݎ݂ݐǡ௧  ߚହ ܺǡ௧ ߙ  ߛ௧  ߝǡ௧
୲

(2)

The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real personal income per
capita in state ݅ in period  ݐ ݊ (݊=10 or 20). For ݊=10, the periods are 1970-1979, 19801989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. For ݊=20, the periods are 1970-1989 and 1990-2009. The
availability of high-frequency data at the U.S. state level is a major advantage of cross-state
studies compared to cross-country analyses where many variables of interest rarely reflect
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initial conditions. To minimize endogeneity here all control variables are measured at the
beginning of each period. I control for the initial real per capita personal income (൫ݕǡ௧ ൯),
which is expected to have a negative sign indicating the existence of convergence effects.
The primary measure of income inequality in the main specifications is the Gini coefficient
(݃݅݊݅). I conduct robustness checks in section 6 where I replace the Gini coefficient with
several alternative measures of income inequality constructed by Frank (2009). In the crossstate analysis of Panizza (2002), income inequality has a negative effect on economic growth
so I expect this effect to be negative here too. The matrix ܺ includes variables that are
correlated with both income inequality and growth. The percentage of the population with a
college degree or more (college) is included to reflect the effect of human capital
accumulation on economic growth26. I also control for the percentage of the population that
lives in urban areas ( )ܾ݊ܽݎݑas well as the fraction of the population over 65 years old
(ݎ݁ݒͷ). In addition, for specifications including differential fertility, I add the birth rate
(ܾ݅݁ݐܽݎ݄ݐݎ. I do this because it is important to separate the effect of general population
trends from the effect of group-specific fertility. If population trends are not accounted for,
the coefficient on differential fertility might also capture the overall effect of fertility on
growth rather than just the effect of differential fertility. In other words, in order to
understand if who has children (rather than the overall number of children) matters for
growth, the regression should explicitly control for the general population trends. Following
Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) who finds that the effect of differential fertility on growth
depends on the level of income inequality, in model (2) I introduce an interaction term

As a robustness check I replace the percentage of the population with a college degree or more with the
percentage of the population with a high school degree or more.

26
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between ݂݂݀݅݁ݕݐ݈݅݅ݐݎ݂݈݁ܽ݅ݐ݊݁ݎand ݃݅݊݅. In this non-linear model, the effect of
differential fertility is represented by ߚଷ + ߚସ ݅݊݅݃ כ.

3.5

Results

3.5.1 Linear Model
Table 3.2 presents results from the fixed effects estimation corresponding to model
(1). In the discussion that follows I refer to the results in the preferred specification 1.2. The
coefficient on initial personal income is negative and statistically significant. This result
supports the idea that poorer states grow faster than rich ones, after controlling for factors
contributing to long-run growth, so that all states eventually reach the same steady state
(conditional convergence). Similar to Panizza (2002), the coefficient on income inequality is
negative and highly statistically significant indicating that if income inequality increases by
0.10, on average growth rates will be reduced by 0.63 percentage points on an annual basis.
As expected, human capital accumulation represented by the percentage of the population
with a college degree or higher, has a favorable effect on growth. Economic growth is
negatively affected by higher birth rates but differential fertility does not seem to have any
effect when growth is measured over a 10-year period. In DD, differential fertility affects the
level of human capital by changing the relative proportions of high-educated and loweducated people. To the extent that the same mechanism works at the state level, the lack of
statistical significance of initial differential fertility on average 10-year growth could be
explained by the fact that a longer term effect of differential fertility on human capital will
need more time to materialize because in the U.S., human capital accumulation is typically
not complete until approximately two decades after birth (late teens for completed high
school and early twenties for completed college). In contrast, human capital accumulation
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and entry into the labor market vary substantially across countries and in the case of
developing countries, are typically finalized much earlier.
To test if the effect of differential fertility on economic growth depends on the length
of the growth episode, I next estimate model (1) but I replace the dependent variable with
the average annual growth rate of personal income per capita over a 20-year period instead
of a 10-year period (Table 3.3).
Table 3.2 Linear Model; 10-year growth periods: 1970 – 2009
Fixed Effects
Dep. var.: Avg.
annual growth
1970-2009

1.1

1.2

-0.83**
(0.33)
-6.25**
gini
(2.77)
-0.04*
urban
(0.02)
0.11
over65
(0.09)
0.01**
college
(0.01)
-0.32***
birth rate
(0.04)
0.09
dtfr
(0.25)
Observations
192
192
R-squared
0.58
0.69
Number of groups
48
48
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term and
time indicator variables omitted from table.

ln(y)

-0.62*
(0.33)
-8.09***
(2.76)
-0.06**
(0.02)
0.34**
(0.13)
0.01*
(0.00)

The results from Table 3.2 hold only partially in this case. Initial income per capita is
still a very strong predictor of future growth rates and supports the convergence hypothesis.
However, the initial percentage of the population with completed college or higher is not
correlated with growth. The effect of the initial level of income inequality disappears over
such a long period of time compared to the 10-year growth episodes where its effect was
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very pronounced.27 It is interesting to note that the coefficient on differential fertility is only
marginally insignificant (it is statistically significant at 10.2%).
Table 3.3 Linear Model; 20-year growth periods: 1970 – 2009
Fixed Effects
Dependent variable:
Average annual growth
rate of personal income
1960 – 2009

1.3

1.4

-7.16***
(0.37)
-1.29
gini
(4.27)
0.02
urban
(0.03)
-0.13
over65
(0.10)
0.02
college
(0.06)
-0.11
birth rate
(0.09)
-0.59
dtfr
(0.36)
Observations
96
96
R-squared
0.63
0.68
Number of groups
48
48
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term and time
indicator variables omitted from table.

ln(y)

-6.63***
(0.35)
-4.48
(4.59)
0.03
(0.03)
-0.22**
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.05)

To explore the possibility that the relationship between differential fertility and
growth could change over time, I do a cross sectional analysis of 10-year and 20-year
periods. The coefficients on income inequality and differential fertility are presented in Table
3.4.
Differential fertility and income inequality are not statistically significant for any of
the 10-year growth periods but do become significant in the last 20-year period between
1990 and 2009. This suggests that if the fertility rate by educational attainment increases by
This result is similar to Panizza (2002) who also finds that income inequality matters more for U.S. state-level
economic growth over ten years while its effect on average 20-year growth rates disappears.
27
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1, average annual growth will be reduced by 0.62 on an annual basis. As a result of the
modest decrease in differential fertility by 0.04 between 1990 and 2000, annual growth rates
increase by 0.02 percentage points on average. We can conclude that there is weak evidence
for a linear relationship between differential fertility and growth in the long term (20 years)
but that result is limited to the later part of the period under study and might be influenced
by time invariant unobserved state-specific characteristics that are not accounted for.
Table 3.4 Cross sectional regressions
10-year and 20-year growth periods
Dependent variable:
Average annual growth
rate of personal income

gini

differential
fertility

2.91
(4.58)
-2.32
(8.25)
1.84
(3.69)
2.89
(4.78)

0.11
(0.89)
-0.57
(0.81)
-0.14
(0.28)
-0.26
(0.21)

10-year periods
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2009

20-year periods
1970-1989

7.43
(9.50)
1980-1999
-6.95
(8.56)
1990-2009
8.45***
(2.96)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

-0.58
(0.89)
-1.33
(1.18)
-0.62*
(0.36)

It is important to point out that even though differential fertility appears to be
correlated with growth in the last 20 years, there is no empirical evidence that it serves as a
channel for the effect of income inequality as in DD. In their cross-country empirical
analysis, income inequality is a determinant of growth but not when differential fertility is
controlled for. Here this is not the case because income inequality and differential fertility
each have a separate effect on 1990-2009 growth.

44

3.5.2 Nonlinear Model
Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) shows that in the cross-country context, the effect of
differential fertility on growth depends on the level of income inequality. Her results suggest
that this effect is positive for highly unequal countries and negative for countries with a
more equal income distribution. Intuitively, this finding could be related to the fact that
higher differential fertility in developing countries increases the proportion of unskilled labor
which is relatively more abundant and is the main growth driver in those countries.28 If this
is the case, for more equal countries that rely primarily on skilled labor, the larger share of
unskilled labor (and smaller share of skilled labor) slows down growth. To the extent that the
role of skilled and unskilled labor in the production function varies across states, a similar
mechanism could be at play on a subnational level too. Alternatively, it could be the case that
in states with high levels of income inequality, an increase in differential fertility and a
subsequent increase in the share of low-educated people will exacerbate income inequality
further and create an inequality trap which will in turn reduce growth rates. Finally, it is also
possible that such a nonlinear effect does not exist because of the relative homogeneity of
states in terms of observable and unobservable factors affecting growth. Table 3.5 presents
the empirical results from estimating model (2) which takes into consideration the possibility
for a nonlinear relationship.
As expected, there is no effect of differential fertility on average annual growth over
10 years. However, there is strong evidence of a nonlinear effect when analyzing growth
over 20 years. The coefficients on both differential fertility and the interaction term between
differential fertility and income inequality are statistically significant and their linear
combination is also highly statistically significant at the 1% significance level in regression
Since those countries have specialized in unskilled labor intensive processes due to the abundance of
unskilled labor (Galor and Mountford, 2008).
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2.2. For states with a Gini coefficient above 0.43 (relatively high inequality), an increase in
differential fertility will lower growth, but if the income distribution in a state is more equal
(below 0.43), higher differential fertility will have a favorable effect on growth. It should be
noted that in this sample the only period when income inequality is below 0.43 is 1970 and
that was the case for only five states - Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. This means that the relationship between differential fertility and economic
growth is generally negative for most U.S. states. The point estimates indicate that for levels
of the Gini coefficient above 0.43, differential fertility is negatively correlated with growth
rates. At the mean level of income inequality (gini=0.51), the effect of increasing the
education-based fertility gap by 1 would lead to a decrease in average annual rates of
economic growth by approximately 0.75 percentage points.
At the country level this finding is consistent with the previous literature showing a
positive relationship for highly unequal countries and a negative relationship for countries
with more equal income distributions like the U.S. However, the results also imply that states
with more (less) unequal income distributions experience lower (higher) growth when the
education-based fertility differential increases, which is the opposite to the cross-country
results of Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014). This suggests that if differential fertility is a
determinant of growth rates, the transmission mechanism and effects might be different for
states and for countries. One possible explanation for the effect on state-level growth is
related to the role of differential fertility as a potential determinant of future human capital
as in DD. Higher differential fertility in a more unequal state will increase the share of loweducated people since in the U.S. there is a certain degree of intergenerational persistence of
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economic status29. In turn, this will lower the future level of human capital which will reduce
growth rates.
Table 3.5 Nonlinear Model 1970 – 2009
Dependent variable:
Average annual growth rate of
personal income
1960 – 2009

2.1
10-year growth
periods

2.2
20-year growth
periods

-0.79**
(0.33)
-2.47
(4.79)
-0.05*
(0.02)
0.14
(0.12)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.31***
(0.05)
2.34
(2.14)
-4.12
(3.69)
192

-6.92***
(0.33)
12.09**
(4.88)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.08
(0.08)
0.06
(0.05)
-0.08
(0.06)
4.06***
(1.39)
-9.44***
(2.56)
96

ln(y)
gini
urban
over65
college
birth rate
dtfr
dtfr * gini

Observations
Prob>F
0.27
0.01
݀ ݎ݂ݐ ݀ ݅݊݅݃ כ ݎ݂ݐൌ Ͳ
R-squared
0.69
0.72
Number of groups
48
48
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term omitted from table.

3.6

Sensitivity Analysis

3.6.1 Measures of Income Inequality
From a theoretical cross-country perspective there is reason to believe that
differential fertility channels the effect of income inequality on growth as in DD. In section
5, I find that differential fertility is correlated with economic growth in the long run but the
results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 support the idea that income inequality has an independent

29

Stokey (1998) and Solon (1999) discuss the literature on intergenerational persistence of economic status.
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effect on growth rates that is separate from the effect of differential fertility. The preferred
measure of income inequality used in the cross-country literature is the Gini coefficient,
which I also use in the previous section. However, the cross-state literature focusing on the
effect of income inequality on economic growth has shown that the magnitude and statistical
strength of the coefficient on income inequality depends significantly on the type of income
inequality measure. I begin this section by using the income inequality measures constructed
by Frank (2009) to check the sensitivity of my results. In Table 3.6 I replace the Gini
coefficient from regression 1.8 and 2.2 with the top decile income share, the income share of
the top 1%, the Theil entropy index, and the Atkinson index. The top decile and top 1%
income share are typical measures used in the cross-country literature and reflect the share of
income earned by the wealthiest 10% and 1% of the population respectively. The Theil
entropy index belongs to the entropy class of inequality indices that measure deviations from
perfect equality. Its distinguishing feature is that it is a decomposable inequality measure
which is sensitive to changes in the upper tail of the income distribution.30 It is the sum of
within-group inequality and between-group inequality (Schorrock, 1980) and its advantage
over the Gini coefficient is that, since it is a decomposable measure, it is informative of the
importance of between group inequality for the overall observed inequality.31 The Atkinson
index belongs to the class of welfare-based measures of income inequality. It takes into
account the sensitivity of observed inequality to income changes in the ends of the income
distribution by using an inequality aversion parameter (Allison, 1978). The higher the
inequality aversion parameter, the more sensitive the index is to changes in the lower end of
the income distribution. The Atkinson index used here was calculated with an inequality

30
31

See http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/445/theil_index_051en.pdf (accessed 5/15/2014).
See Appendix A for the calculation of the Theil entropy index.
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aversion parameter of 0.5 which makes it sensitive to changes in the upper end of the
income distribution.
The results from the sensitivity check generally agree with the main results although
they exhibit a certain degree of sensitivity. In the linear 20-year growth model the coefficient
on differential fertility is never statistically significant. In fact, it is strongest (but still not
statistically significant) in the baseline specification using the Gini coefficient. The results
from the nonlinear model are also in line with my previous findings confirming the existence
of a nonlinear effect. The positive main effect of differential fertility implies that for
countries with a perfectly equal income distribution (gini=0), higher differential fertility is
positively correlated with growth but the negative coefficient on the interaction term
suggests that this positive effect decreases with higher levels of inequality. The correlation
between differential fertility and income growth is positive at very low levels of inequality
and is negative for the levels of inequality observed in this sample.
Table 3.6 Sensitivity Check with Different Measures of Income Inequality
Fixed Effects Model, 20-year growth periods
Dependent variable:
Average annual growth
rate of personal income
1960 – 2009

Linear model
dtfr
Nonlinear model
dtfr
dtfr * inequality
Prob>F
݀ ݎ݂ݐ ݀ ݕݐ݈݅ܽݑݍ݁݊݅ כ ݎ݂ݐൌ Ͳ

Top 10%
income
share

Top 1%
Income
share

Theil
Entropy
index

Atkinson
index

-0.59
(0.36)

-0.49
(0.39)

-0.52
(0.39)

-0.37
(0.41)

-0.30
(0.42)

4.06***
(1.39)
-9.44***
(2.56)

4.15**
(1.57)
-14.78***
(4.62)

1.06
(0.85)
-19.75**
(8.98)

1.27*
(0.64)
-3.99***
(1.30)

1.85
(1.21)
-12.17*
(6.57)

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.02

0.06

Gini

3.6.2 Expanded Sample
Often, the cross-state literature excludes Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of
Columbia but when assessing the impact of the education-based fertility differential on
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economic growth there is no compelling reason to restrict the sample to the contiguous
states only. Table 3.7 presents results from the 20-year linear and nonlinear models from the
sample of 48 states (regressions 1.4 and 2.2) along with the results using the expanded
sample. The main results remain largely unchanged with no effect on differential fertility in
the linear model and a large and statistically significant effect in the nonlinear model.
Table 3.7 Sensitivity Check with Expanded Sample;
20-year growth periods Fixed Effects
Dependent variable:
Average annual growth
rate of personal income
1960 – 2009

Linear model
dtfr
Nonlinear model
dtfr
dtfr * gini

48 state
sample

50 state
sample

-0.59
(0.36)

-0.31
(0.40)

4.06***
(1.39)
-9.44***
(2.56)

5.02***
(1.55)
-10.88***
(2.96)

0.01

0.01

Prob>F
݀ ݎ݂ݐ ݀ ݅݊݅݃ כ ݎ݂ݐൌ Ͳ

3.7

Conclusion

Past studies on the relationship between population dynamics and economic growth
have focused extensively on the effects of overall fertility rates without taking into account
the possibility that the fertility dynamics within different parts of the population might play a
vital role for the development path. Moreover, such studies often ignore subnational
variation in demographic trends by focusing exclusively on cross-country analyses. In this
paper, I construct a dataset measuring differences in fertility rates of women with different
levels of educational attainment using the Decennial Census and the CPS to evaluate the role
of differential fertility on long-run growth at the U.S. state-level.
Although the existing cross-country literature has suggested that differential fertility
could channel the effect of income inequality on growth I do not find evidence that this is
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the case. Using a fixed effects model that accounts for unobserved state-specific
characteristics I find evidence suggesting that differential fertility is a stand-alone
determinant of long-run growth rates in the U.S. A larger gap in fertility rates between
highly-educated and less-educated women is strongly associated with a decrease in the rate of
long-run economic growth across U.S. states, even after accounting for the levels of
inequality and fertility. This effect could possibly be related to the role of differential fertility
in altering the future educational composition of the population. However, additional
investigation is necessary to test this hypothesis and pinpoint the exact causes of this effect.

Copyright © Maria Apostolova-Mihaylova 2014
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4. Health Insurance, Fertility, and the Wantedness of
Pregnancies: Evidence from Massachusetts
4.1

Introduction

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is the first successful
attempt in the U.S. to provide near-universal health insurance coverage at the national level
but in recent years similar policies have been implemented at the state and local levels.32
Among these reforms, the Massachusetts health care law is the most prominent example of
increasing health insurance coverage. The Massachusetts experience has been used to study
questions of critical importance like changes in health outcomes and costs following the
expansion of health insurance but given that the Massachusetts legislation served as a model
for the design of the PPACA, the answers to these questions have broader implications
about the future consequences of the national reform.
It is well established that coverage rates increased as a result of the reform in
Massachusetts, although there is disagreement about the exact magnitude of the effect.33 One
of the intended consequences was that the out-of-pocket cost of expensive medical events,
which include pregnancy-related expenses, was reduced due to increased insurance
coverage.34 Thus, women of child-bearing age who wanted to have children could have been
incentivized by the reform to plan and carry out a pregnancy if they were previously
In 2003 Maine enacted the “Dirigo Health Reform”, in 2006 Vermont adopted “Catamount Health”, in 2007
the city of San Francisco launched the program “Healthy San Francisco”, and in 2006 Massachusetts enacted
the “Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care”. The first three reforms rely
primarily on subsidies for purchasing health insurance, while the Massachusetts law also includes an individual
mandate, an employer mandate, and an expansion in Medicaid.
33 Official estimates for the uninsured rate in 2008 were 2.6 percent, but Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) find that
uninsured rates are underreported because the reform incentivizes people to hide their true insurance status if
they are uninsured. According to their estimates, which exclude imputed values for health insurance questions,
the uninsured rate is 3.8 percent.
34 Birth-related expenses in the U.S. range from $10,657 to $23,927 for 2011 depending on the site and method
of birth U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, HCUPnet, Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project.
Rockville, MD: AHRQ. See http://transform.childbirthconnection.org/resources/datacenter/chargeschart/
(accessed 11/16/2013).
32
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uninsured. In addition to moral hazard from expanding health insurance coverage, adverse
selection may still be important in the design of the Massachusetts legislation and the
PPACA. Even with an individual mandate, individuals are given the option to remain
uninsured by paying a penalty (which starts off relatively small, and increases over time) or
purchase less comprehensive coverage.35 With guaranteed issue and modified community
rating, women of childbearing age might then purchase more comprehensive coverage when
anticipating pregnancy and childbirth and avoid such coverage if they do not anticipate
pregnancy.36 The ease of movement in and out of generous plans due to adverse selection
further subsidizes high-cost, anticipated medical events like pregnancy.
In addition to lowering the costs of having a baby, the Massachusetts law also
lowered the costs of preventing a pregnancy because the use of family planning services and
access to reliable contraception became easier.37 As a result, women of child-bearing age who
did not want to get pregnant might have increased their use of reliable birth control and
decreased their fertility. In terms of the PPACA, funding for birth control, family planning,
and abortion has become a very controversial topic with several attempts to alter the
relevant provisions of the law. At present, the use of federal funding for abortion, except in
For example, catastrophic health insurance plans offered under the PPACA are available to those under age
30. It covers essential health benefits (including maternity and newborn care) but the high deductibles
(approximately $6300 for an individual) would likely deter many women who anticipate pregnancy from
purchasing such a policy. See https://www.healthcare.gov/can-i-buy-a-catastrophic-plan/ for eligibility
requirements (accessed 11/19/2013), and
https://www.nebraskablue.com/~/media/Broker%20Communications/2014_Individual_Renewal/92139.pdf
for an example of specific provisions related to deductibles and pregnancy expenses.
36 Feldstein (2013) argues such a design will encourage those who are healthy to strategically remain uninsured
until they have a potentially costly medical diagnosis. See http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/martin-feldstein-on-how-america-s-health-care-reform-could-unravel (accessed
11/19/2013).
37 The most reliable, non-permanent, forms of contraception include IUDs and implants (with less than 1
pregnancy per 100 women each year), and shots, pills, rings and patches (with 2-9 pregnancies per 100 women
each year). Each of these requires either a doctor’s prescription or contact with a health care provider and can
involve significant out-of-pocket costs if uninsured. Less reliable forms of contraception (with between 15-25
pregnancies per 100 women) include diaphragms, male condoms, female condoms, withdrawal, sponges,
cervical caps, and spermicide. These typically do not require contact with physicians or health care providers,
and often entail lower out-of-pockets costs for the uninsured. See http://www.plannedparenthood.org/healthtopics/birth-control/birth-control-effectiveness-chart-22710.htm, (accessed 11/19/2013).
35
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rare cases, is prohibited by an executive order of the President. The national legislation also
includes a mandate for contraception coverage applicable to all health insurance. In addition,
all new health plans must cover certain women’s preventive services with no co-payments,
including the full range of FDA-approved contraception methods and contraceptive
counseling.38 To the extent that this mandate remains unchanged, studying the response of
birth rates in Massachusetts can provide useful insights into the broader demographic effects
of the PPACA.39
In this paper we use the exogenous nature of the Massachusetts healthcare reform to
identify the effect of changes in insurance coverage on fertility behavior. Previous studies
exploring the fertility effects of Medicaid expansions for the poor have found limited
evidence of moral hazard effects. To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine fertility
responses in the context of the Massachusetts healthcare reform. We rely on the American
Community Survey (ACS), which is uniquely positioned to study this issue because of its
explicit questions on fertility and sizable samples. When we use a straightforward differencein-differences strategy, we do not find any change in fertility rates for the full sample of
women of childbearing age (15-44 years old), a result which is consistent with some earlier
work. Since insurance coverage rates also vary based on socioeconomic characteristics
(rather than just by state and year), we further parameterize the changes in coverage. Our
preferred specification replaces the standard difference-in-differences estimator with this
more parameterized version of insurance coverage. Even with this parameterized
See http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ and
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/us_healthstateprofiles.pdf (accessed 11/19/2013). The
guidelines concerning contraceptive methods and counseling do not apply to women who are participants or
beneficiaries in group health plans sponsored by religious employers. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2013-07-02/pdf/2013-15866.pdf (accessed 11/19/2013).
39 There is ongoing litigation on the birth control mandate, mostly centered on the argument that it violates the
religious beliefs of various religious groups and employers. See Greene, “ACA Contraception Mandate Spurs
Litigation Onslaught”, National Law Journal, November 4, 2013, accessed from
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202626192894 on 11/19/2013.
38
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specification, we do not find an effect on fertility when we examine all women or stratify the
sample based on age. Our key finding emerges when we analyze the fertility effect by age
and marital status – the Massachusetts law increased fertility rates for married women aged
20-34 by 1 percent and decreased fertility rates for unmarried women in the same age group
by 9 percent. These opposite-signed results potentially reflect the differential degree of
wantedness of pregnancies that varies by marital status. These effects cancel each other out
which is why we do not observe a fertility effect in the aggregate. Fertility rates for women
aged 15-19 and 35-44 did not change as a result of the Massachusetts reform. The lack of
effect is not surprising given that younger women did not experience large gains in insurance
coverage (hence, identification is more difficult) and fertility rates for older women are
generally very low (hence, there is a heterogeneous behavioral response). These results are
robust to the inclusion of different sets of control variables and a variety of specification
checks.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section II we survey the
existing literature on the Massachusetts health insurance reform and the fertility responses to
expanding public health insurance coverage. Section III provides a description and timeline
for health insurance reform in Massachusetts. In Section IV we discuss the predicted effects
of expanding health insurance coverage on fertility, and show how the response should vary
by observable characteristics. Section V describes our data. Section VI presents the empirical
framework and the findings are shown in section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes.

4.2

Literature Review

Our paper adds to an emerging literature evaluating the causal effect of the
Massachusetts health care reform on various outcomes of significant policy relevance. This is
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an important topic because of the unique opportunity to draw conclusions and make
predictions about the possible effects of the Affordable Care Act, the main provisions of
which are closely aligned with those of the Massachusetts health care reform. Insurance
coverage and health care utilization are among the main outcomes that have been examined
to date by the literature.40 Our paper adds to the broader understanding of the effects of this
policy by evaluating the extent to which an important and permanent outcome – individual
fertility behavior – changes in response to increased health insurance coverage.
Several studies examine the effect of this reform on changes in insurance status since
a key goal of the Massachusetts health insurance law was to achieve nearly-universal
coverage. There is a general consensus that uninsured rates decreased although there is some
disagreement on the exact magnitude. Early studies by Long (2008) and Long, Stockley, and
Yemane (2009) find reductions in the uninsured rate of approximately 50 percent among all
adults aged 18-64, while Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) attribute only a 36 percent decrease
in the uninsured rates to the new law.41,42 Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) show that
Massachusetts residents with incomes between 150-300 percent of the Federal Poverty Level
(FPL), who are most likely to be affected by the reform, tend to underreport their insurance
Other outcomes of interest are health outcomes, crowd-out of private health insurance, labor market effects,
and adverse selection. Courtemanche and Zapata (2012) find that the reform lead to improved self-reported
health for minority, low-income, and near-elderly individuals. Miller (2012b) finds evidence that the probability
for a child to be in excellent health increased by 6 percentage points after implementation. Yelowitz and
Cannon (2010) show reductions in self-reported excellent health but also show gains in good self-reported
health. Long (2008) finds that the share of people who had employer-provided health insurance remained the
same in the early stages of the Massachusetts reform and Miller (2012b) demonstrates that among children
private insurance coverage increased by 8-10 percentage points. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) find limited
evidence that private health insurance was replaced by Medicaid among hospitalized patients only, while
Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) report that private coverage decreased among children and low-income adults.
Kolstad and Kowalski (2012b) examine the efficiency and welfare impact of the reform in the labor market.
Hackman, Kolstrad, and Kowalski (2012) find that increased coverage resulted in lower costs per enrollee
which is evidence for the existence of adverse selection in the pre-reform Massachusetts health insurance
market.
41 Long (2008) uses data collected from two a telephone surveys – one conducted in the fall of 2006 and one
conducted in the fall of 2007. Long, Stockley and Yemane (2009) use CPS data from 2004-2007.
42 Long (2008) finds that the uninsured rate decreased from 13.0 percent from fall 2006 to 7.1 percent in fall
2007 among adults. Long, Stockley, and Yemane (2009) find that the uninsured rate decreased from 12 percent
to 5.4 percent in the first year after the reform.
40
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status in the CPS, which likely results in an underestimation of the officially reported
uninsured rate.
The reform-induced gains in health insurance coverage were different based on
socioeconomic characteristics because the law did not impact all state residents in the same
way. Several studies find that the drop in uninsured rates was more substantial among lowincome adults and young adults while it was very modest for older and wealthier
individuals.43 For example, Niedzwiecki (2013) shows that insurance coverage increased
mostly for poor adults and individuals aged 19-30 years. On the other hand, the reform did
not significantly affect children’s health insurance status. Long, Stockley, and Yemane (2009)
find that uninsured rates among children did not change immediately after the reform while
Miller (2012b) shows that children and young teens (less than 18 years old) saw an
economically insignificant increase in insurance coverage in the order of 2 percentage
points.44 These findings are not surprising given that coverage rates of children and teenagers
are typically quite high because they are often eligible under a parent’s health insurance
policy or through the Medicaid.
In addition to lowering uninsured rates, the Massachusetts reform also changed
healthcare utilization; the results suggest greater efficiency afterwards. The use of preventive
healthcare services increased following the implementation of the law. Miller (2012a)
examines how increased health insurance coverage affected emergency room (ER) use and
finds that the reform resulted in reductions between 5-8.4 percent in ER visits mainly for
nonemergency medical events and during normal business hours. Kolstad and Kowalski
Long (2008) shows that the overall reduction in uninsured rates was driven by a 46 percent drop for adults
with incomes up to 300 percent of the FPL. She also finds a statistically significant decrease in uninsured rates
for adults with incomes over 300 percent of the FPL but Long, Stockley, and Yemane (2009) do not find such
an effect using CPS data.
44 Even though the overall effect on insured rate among children is small, Miller (2012b) does find that the
reform altered substantially the type of insurance coverage children were getting.
43
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(2012a) observe a similar effect on emergency room hospitalizations which decreased by 5.2
percentage points following the reform and were largely driven by reductions for patients
from poor areas. They also examine preventable admissions and find reductions for severe
patients of about 2.7 percent. Niedzwiecki (2013) shows that the use of preventive
healthcare services increased through a reduction in avoidable hospitalizations, although he
also finds an overall increase in emergency department visits.
To our knowledge, there are no studies that examine moral hazard in the context of
the Massachusetts reform as it relates to individual fertility behavior. Most work focusing on
fertility-related moral hazard effects uses the exogenous variation in state Medicaid
expansions that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. A notable exception is Leibowitz (1990)
who uses data from the RAND health insurance experiment to show that pregnancy rates
and births increased temporarily by 29 percent in response to random assignment of free
health insurance coverage.45
Work using the Medicaid expansions mostly shows a heterogeneous response of
birth rates based on socio-demographic characteristics with little evidence for an overall
effect.46 Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) examine birth rates of unmarried young women
(19-27 years old) with less than 12 years of education and find that Medicaid expansions
increased birth rates of white women by 5 percent. They further demonstrate that the
fertility response varies by income because birth rates increased more during the first wave
of the Medicaid expansions when coverage was extended to individuals with incomes up to
100 percent of the FPL.47 Zavodny and Bitler (2010) analyze the fertility effects of Medicaid
Insurance coverage was randomly assigned and varied based on the level of co-insurance rate and the
maximum out-of-pocket expenditure.
46 An exception is Yelowitz (1994) who does find an overall increase in birth rates of 5 percent for women aged
15-44. He also finds a differential effect by race and marital status.
47 The second wave of Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and early 1990s qualified pregnant women for
Medicaid if family income was less than 185 percent FPL.
45
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expansions for all women of childbearing age (15 to 44 years old). They measure the fertility
effect of Medicaid expansions by using the fraction of women eligible or the statutory
Medicaid income eligibility threshold. They find no evidence for an overall effect, but do
find that a 100 percentage point increase in the income eligibility threshold for Medicaid
would increase birth rates by 7.7 percent among low-educated white women. This is
consistent with the idea that there are heterogeneous effects for different subgroups in the
population. DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2011) construct birth rates by state, year, quarter,
and demographic cell based on age, marital status, and education for women aged 15-44.
Recognizing that Medicaid expansions affected women differently, they construct a policy
variable as the fraction of the population eligible for Medicaid which varies by quarter, state,
year, and demographic cell. They find weak evidence that expansions of public health
insurance coverage had an effect on birth rates. In models that only include state, year, and
quarter fixed effects, and state-year fixed effects, but do not control for demographic
characteristics, increasing Medicaid eligibility has a positive and statistically significant effect
on birth rates of approximately 1.2 percentage points for whites and 2.4 percentage points
for African-Americans. However, this result is quite sensitive to changes in the specification.
A limitation of this study is that it ignores the potentially differential effect of insurance on
birth rates for groups with different demographic characteristics, which is a key contribution
of our study.
The increased availability of health insurance not only lowers the cost of having a
baby but also lowers the cost of not having a baby, because almost all health plans cover
contraception (and some cover abortion).48 Importantly, in Massachusetts after the reform,

The PPACA contraception mandate requiring all health insurance plans to offer contraceptive coverage at no
cost exempts churches and non-profit religious groups from this provision while their female employees can
still have contraceptive coverage paid directly by the insurance company. This mandate also spurred litigation
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the publicly subsidized “Commonwealth Care” plan covered a full range of family planning
services including abortion care. Using non-representative data collected through surveys
and interviews Dennis et al. (2012) conclude that access to affordable contraception
improved for low-income women post-reform even though they faced several challenges.49
Family planning community centers have provided critical support for overcoming these
obstacles (Dennis et al, 2009) and might play an important role of entry to the health care
system for particular groups of women in the context of the national health care law (Gold,
2009). An important distinction between the Massachusetts experience and the PPACA is
that national health care reform mandates contraception coverage at no cost while in
Massachusetts there was still an element of cost-sharing.50 Since both the cost of having a
baby and the cost of not having a baby are typically reduced by increased availability of
health insurance, the net effect on birth rates is ambiguous.
The literature examining the effect of Medicaid expansions on fertility behavior
focuses primarily on net birth rates with few studies analyzing the impact on abortion
rates.51,52 Zavodny and Bitler (2010) do not find an overall effect on abortion rates but due to

on the basis of employers’ religious beliefs where for-profit business owners also fight for an exemption. This
issue is pending review by the Supreme Court in November 2013. Source:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/us/court-rules-contraception-mandate-infringes-on-religiousfreedom.html?ref=contraception accessed on 11/17/2013.
49 Particular problems identified in this study for low-income women include understanding and maintaining
health insurance coverage, filling out prescriptions, and obtaining appointments with a healthcare provider
mostly stemming from the fact that before the reform these women’s contraceptive needs were met almost
exclusively by family planning community centers but after the reform these women had to, independently,
understand their coverage, select a doctor, make an appointment, and fill a prescription.
50 The national reform allows a co-pay can be charged for use of brand name contraceptives if a generic
contraceptive exists National Women’s Law Center, (“Contraceptive Coverage in the Health Care Law:
Frequently Asked Questions“, February 2013 from:
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/us_healthstateprofiles.pdf., accessed on 11/19/2013; Dennis et
al. (2012).
51 Since 1972 Medicaid has covered the use of contraception (Kearney and Levine, 2009).
52 The Hyde Amendment, passed in 1976, prohibits the use of federal funds for abortions except in cases of
rape and incest or when the life of the mother is endangered. As a federally-funded program, Medicaid does
not cover abortions under both fee-for-service and managed care frameworks (National Committee for a
Human Life Amendment, “The Hyde Amendment”, April 2008 from: http://nchla.org/issues.asp?ID=1,
from: accessed on 11/16/2013).
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data limitations they are unable to stratify the sample by demographic characteristics. Joyce,
Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) examine birth rates and abortion rates separately in order to split
the confounding effects of subsidized health insurance. They also do not find an overall
effect but show that restricted Medicaid funding for abortions led to a decrease in abortion
rates of approximately 10 percent among white women, which is consistent with increased
use of family planning services for this group. Joyce and Kaestner (1996) also show a
reduced likelihood of abortion for young, low-educated nonblack women. Kearney and
Levine (2009) specifically examine the impact of income-based expanded Medicaid eligibility
for family planning services on teen and adult birth rates and contraceptive use. 53 They find
that fertility of women in different age groups responds differently to the income-based
expansions with the largest effect among 18-24 year-olds where birth rates declined by 5.16.8 percentage points. They are able to show that this result is mainly driven by an increased
probability of contraceptive use. These findings provide strong motivation for analyzing the
fertility responses separately for different demographic groups because of the variation in
their underlying fertility rates and possibly wantedness of the pregnancy. We expand on this
hypothesis in the next section.
Our survey of the relevant literature indicates that the Massachusetts reform
achieved its goal of expanding insurance coverage although some groups saw larger gains in
insurance coverage than others. It also led to increased health care services utilization.
Studies focusing on the Medicaid expansions generally find that the fertility behavior of
different demographic groups is affected differently with little evidence for an overall effect.
Policies expanding subsidized family planning services have been found to be effective in
reducing unintended births through an increased use of contraception.
53

Kearney and Levine (2009) also analyze the effect on abortions and sexual activity.
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4.3

The Massachusetts Health Care Reform Timeline54

The sweeping healthcare law dramatically changed the landscape of the
Massachusetts health insurance market. The implementation of the reform began in October
2006 and continued through July 2007 (see Table 4.1 for a timeline of its major stages).
Table 4.1 Timeline of Health Care Reform Implementation
April 2006
July 2006
October 2006

Health Care Reform legislation passed
Federal Government approves Medicaid waiver for health care reform
Plan Type I for Commonwealth Care open for enrollment (for residents at 100% of FPL)
Plan Types II, III and IV for Commonwealth Care open for enrollment (for residents
January 2007
between 100% and 300% of FPL)
March 2007
Deadline for Connector Board to set minimum “creditable” coverage standards
Commonwealth Choice plans available – individuals and small businesses can buy
May 2007
insurance
Individual mandate to purchase health insurance
July 1, 2007
Deadline for employers to provide health insurance to full-time employees
Deadline for merging the individual and small-group insurance markets
January 2008
Individual mandate penalty: 50% of premium per month if uninsured
Based on: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Focus on Health Reform”, June 2007, accessed on
11/16/2013 at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7494-02.pdf; State of
Massachusetts, “Massachusetts Health Care Reform Fact Sheet”, accessed on 11/16/2013 at
www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/mrc/health-care-reform-fact-sheet.rtf

During that transition period, the state expanded coverage under Medicaid and the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for children with family incomes up to 300
percent FPL and raised enrollment caps for adults. The law also allowed adults younger than
26 years to remain on their parents’ health insurance plans. In addition, the state provided
subsidized coverage to individuals with family incomes up to 300 percent FPL on a slidingscale basis with full subsidies for those with incomes up to 150 percent FPL
(Commonwealth Care).
The individual mandate – effective July 2007 – required individuals to purchase
health insurance or pay a fine equal to their personal state income tax exemption (in the first

This section is based on The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Focus on Health Reform”, May 2012,
accessed on 11/16/2013 at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8311.pdf.
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year) or a penalty of up to 50 percent of the lowest health insurance premium they would be
eligible for (after the first year).
Standards of coverage and costs were established for insurance companies who had
to offer health insurance at (modified) community-rated premiums, mandated minimum
coverage, and maximum premiums irrespective of preexisting health conditions and claims
made. The employer mandate required employers with 11 or more full-time employees to
offer employer-provided health insurance or face modest penalties.
As demonstrated by the existing literature, the reform resulted in expanding health
insurance to the vast majority of Massachusetts residents. However, the gains in insurance
were not evenly distributed among the whole population with some demographic groups
gaining more from than others. For example, low-income individuals with family income
close to the FPL were more likely to be covered by Medicaid so the reform did little to
improve coverage rates for them. Likewise, wealthier individuals who tend to get insurance
from employers did not gain much. We use these uneven gains to predict fertility responses
in the next section.

4.4

Predicted Effects of Expanding Health Insurance on
Fertility

Predicting the effects of health insurance reform on fertility in the aggregate is not a
straightforward exercise because in addition to the availability of health insurance, several
other elements, like latent fertility (proxied by age) and wantedness of children (proxied by
marital status) factor into the decision to have a baby. Younger women have higher fertility
rates than older women, because older women are both more likely to have reached their
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desired fertility and more likely to suffer from infertility.55 All else equal, married women are
more likely to become pregnant and carry a baby to term than unmarried women, because
pregnancies are more likely to be planned and wanted.56
These considerations suggest that if expansion of health insurance coverage has
effects on fertility, the effect would vary by age and marital status. All else equal, expanding
insurance coverage will increase fertility of married women (wanted pregnancies) due to
lowering the out-of-pocket cost of pregnancy, while reducing fertility for single women
(unwanted pregnancies) due to better access to reliable contraception. As health insurance
becomes more widely available, births for younger women should increase more than for
older women due to the higher latent fertility rates of the former group.
In addition to the considerations related to latent fertility and wantedness of
pregnancies, the insurance coverage gains varied widely within age/marital status group.
There were clearly gains in Massachusetts (relative to the rest of New England) from 2008
onward (relative to 2003-2006). Moreover, those gains in Massachusetts after the reform
varied by family income. Some groups experienced minimal gains in insurance (such
relatively affluent women who were often covered by private insurance), while others
experienced much larger gains (such as near-poor women). Larger gains in coverage should
lead to larger fertility responses within each age-marital status cell. Figure 4.1 summarizes the
expected fertility effects by age, marital status, and income which reflect variations in latent
fertility, child wantedness, and insurance gains. A woman who was young, married, and nearpoor experienced larger relative gains in insurance coverage and would have been relatively
Around one-third of couples in which the woman is over 35 have fertility problems. See
http://www.womenshealth.gov/publications/our-publications/fact-sheet/infertility.html, accessed
11/20/2013.
56 The majority of children born as the result of an unplanned pregnancy are born to women who are either
single or cohabiting. See http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/resources/pdf/FactSheet-Consequences.pdf,
accessed 11/20/2013.
55
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more likely to have a baby than a similar woman who was richer. A woman who was young,
unmarried, and near-poor experienced larger relative gains in insurance coverage and would
have seen larger relative reductions in fertility compared to a similar woman who was richer.
Figure 4.1 Expected Fertility Effects by Age, Marital Status and Gains In Insurance
Coverage

It is also important to note the importance of the interaction of age and marital
status. One would expect that the fertility responses for older women – regardless of
whether pregnancies were wanted or insurance gains were large – would be much smaller
due to lower latent fertility. For very young women (teenagers), one might expect smaller
fertility responses as well if for no other reason than the insurance gains were typically much
smaller.

4.5

Data Description: ACS, CPS and Vital Statistics

Our primary data source is the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS)
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). We use the one-year sample of the ACS PUMS for
the years 2003-2011 (excluding the transition year of 2007 when the reform was being
phased in). Starting with the 2005 PUMS, approximately one percent of all households in the
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U.S. were surveyed (in 2003 and 2004, the samples are approximately 40 percent the size of
subsequent years). As a consequence, we are able to examine the fertility responses in
Massachusetts relative to other New England states, while retaining sizable samples.
Moreover, we are able to examine responses for narrow demographic groups, such as
married women aged 20-34, where we can more accurately characterize the wantedness of
pregnancies and latent fertility. The ACS often asks similar questions to the now phased-out
decennial Census long forms. Unlike most other household surveys that the Census Bureau
conducts, respondents are required by law to participate in the ACS.57
Important for our purposes, the ACS directly asks fertility questions pertaining to
each woman aged 15-50 in a surveyed household. Specifically, the survey asks “Has this
person given birth to any children in the past 12 months?” Other datasets, such as the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) do not
directly ask about fertility; instead, one might impute fertility from the presence of infants in
a household (i.e. 0-year-olds on the household roster). It is clear that such an imputation
strategy might have difficulty in assigning an infant to a mother if there is more than one
woman of childbearing age in the household. Perhaps more importantly, our investigation of
the ACS shows that many infants are potentially not living with their mothers, and this nonpresence is related to socioeconomic circumstances. As Table 4.2 shows, across all years,
only 80 percent of households where a birth was reported had an infant (0 years) present.
Some of this is certainly confusion about the survey question, however, because the fraction
of households reporting a birth who also have a zero- or one-year-old present is 88

Source: http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/language_brochures/ACSQandA_ENG10.pdf. See
Title 13, United States Code, Sections 141, 193, and 221. The decennial Census is a notable exception in that it
is mandatory.
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percent.58 Nonetheless, there is still an important difference between births and presence of
very young children. Roughly 10 percent of infants live in a household where there is not a
woman reporting a birth.
Table 4.2 Household ages and the ACS fertility question
“Has this person given birth to any children in the past 12 months?”
Fraction of households with minimum age of zero
Households where a birth
Households where a birth
is reported
is not reported

Fraction of zero-year
olds in household
reporting birth
All Years
79.87%
0.20%
92.52%
2011
76.89%
0.17%
92.56%
2010
78.70%
0.17%
93.24%
2009
79.34%
0.16%
94.03%
2008
79.07%
0.18%
93.58%
2006
81.63%
0.23%
91.84%
2005
81.86%
0.25%
91.51%
2004
82.97%
0.26%
91.16%
2003
81.19%
0.30%
90.00%
Notes: Households with a birth include all households where any woman aged 15-50 answered yes to the
fertility question. Otherwise, the household is classified as not having a birth. Tabulations include households
only if the youngest householder’s age is not imputed. All households in US are used in tabulations.
Tabulations are unweighted. Source of questions: Q.24 (2011 Survey Instrument) (asked of females aged 1550); Similar question on other surveys.

In Table 4.3, we show that the modest disconnect between reported births and
presence of infants is largely a function of socioeconomic circumstances. We examine
242,006 women aged 15 to 44 in the 2003-2011 ACS across the entire U.S. who reported a
birth (and where that woman was the only one in the household reporting a birth). The
outcome of interest is whether an infant (defined as age 0) is missing on the household
roster. Unmarried, non-white, and less-educated women are far more likely – 8 to 12
percentage points – to not have a baby present in the household; this may be unsurprising if
the father lives in a separate household or if members of the extended family, like
grandparents, take care of the child. More surprisingly, the likelihood of missing infants
increases sharply with age; 35-39 year-olds are 6 percentage points more likely to not have an
If a household misinterpreted “the last 12 months” with “the last year” or “the last calendar year”, they
might report a one-year-old as a birth.
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infant present, while 40-44 year-olds are nearly 24 percentage points more likely to not have
an infant present. We interpret these age results somewhat differently than the
socioeconomic results, however. Fertility is quite low among these age groups – especially
40-44 year olds – and many of the affirmative responses to the fertility question in the ACS
could simply be survey errors for these women. Given this possibility, we also do our
empirical analysis separately by age group.
Table 4.3 Baby Not Present In Household (Among Women Indicating Birth In Past Year)
-0.0074
(0.0068)
Age 25-29
-0.0052
(0.0088)
Age 30-34
0.0119
(0.0089)
Age 35-39
0.0566
(0.0113)
Age 40-44
0.2376
(0.0156)
Married
-0.0886
(0.0027)
Income 150-250% FPL
0.0367
(0.0025)
Income 250-300% FPL
0.0425
(0.0031)
Income 300%+ FPL
0.0565
(0.0031)
White
-0.081
(0.004)
HS Dropout
0.1195
(0.0039)
HS Graduate
0.0718
(0.0026)
Non-mover
0.0018
(0.0024)
Military service
-0.0104
(0.0053)
Non-citizen
0.0056
(0.0039)
Age 20-24

0.0524
ଶ
Notes: Sample is based on 242,006 women aged 15-44 giving birth in past year in the US, and is limited to
households where there is exactly one woman who indicated giving birth in past year. Baby not present is
defined as not having a 0-year-old in household. Households excluded if the youngest member’s age was
imputed. In addition to the variables shown above, specifications include state fixed effects and year fixed
effects. Omitted categories include Age 15-19, Unmarried, Income 0-150% FPL, Non-white, College Graduate,
Mover, Non-military and Citizen.
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There is one unfortunate drawback of the ACS, however. The ACS did not start
asking questions on health insurance status until 2008, which is the beginning of our “post”
period. As a consequence, we rely on the Current Population Survey (CPS) to derive
insurance rates, and append these to each woman in the ACS sample based on various
socioeconomic characteristics, state of residence, and time period. We use the 2004-2012
CPS March Supplements, which cover calendar years 2003-2011 (excluding 2007), to
compute insured rates for women by demographic category, region and time.59,60 We do this
separately for Massachusetts and the other five New England states combined (Connecticut,
Vermont, Maine, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire). The demographic categories are
based on age, income, and marital status. There are 6 age groups (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34,
40-44), 4 income groups (<150% FPL, 150-250% FPL, 250-300% FPL, >300% FPL), 2
marital statuses (married and unmarried). For each demographic group, we create coverage
rates for 2 regions (Massachusetts and the rest of New England) and 2 periods (“before”
period including calendar years 2003-2006 and “after” period including calendar years 20082011).61 The total number of insurance coverage cells is therefore 192 (6 ages x 4 income x 2
marital x 2 regions x 2 periods). We define a woman as “uninsured” if she is not covered by
private health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or CHAMPUS. The insurance coverage rate is

It is thought that CPS answers to health insurance questions are a blend of current coverage and coverage in
the previous year. Swartz (1986) argues that CPS respondents ignore the precise wording of the health
insurance questions, and instead answer the question as if it referred to coverage as of the survey date.
60 A similar approach was used by DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2011) where the policy variable is an index of
Medicaid eligibility that varies by quarter, state, year, and demographic cell, which is based on age, race, marital
status, and education.
61 We follow the existing literature in treating 2006 as a “before” year because the earliest provisions went into
effect in October 2006. See Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2012), Long, Stockley, and Yemane (2009) and
Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), all of whom use annual data. Given the time horizon for pregnancy, and the
wording of the question in the ACS, the vast majority of pregnancies in this year would have been prior to
reform. In addition, the ACS respondents take the survey throughout the year (and it is not possible for us to
identify the date when the survey was answered). Virtually all studies classify 2007 – where the individual
mandate is implemented in the middle of the year – as a transition year. Our interest lies in the effects of the
fully phased-in reform; thus we focus on 2008 onward as the “after” period.
59
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then the weighted ratio of the number of insured women in each cell to the total number of
women in the cell.
Insurance coverage rates were highest among teenage women (15-19 year-olds) and
older women (aged 35-44) both in Massachusetts and the rest of New England in 2003-2006
(Figure 4.2a). This is expected because teenagers are typically covered under their parents’
health insurance plan or Medicaid and older adults are more likely to be insured due to
improved economic circumstances. The age groups with lowest coverage rates were 20-24
and 25-29 year-olds because young adults leaving college were often no longer covered on a
parent’s plan and may not have a job with fringe benefits like health insurance. The gains in
insurance coverage in Massachusetts following the reform were therefore most pronounced
for these age groups (Figures 4.2b and 4.2c); coverage increased by almost 14 percentage
points for 20-24 year-olds and 8 percentage points for 25-29 year-olds. The changes among
teens and older adults were quite modest in comparison. In contrast to Massachusetts, the
rest of New England experienced relatively small gains and even reductions in coverage rates
for some age groups.
Figure 4.2 Insurance Coverage Rates By Age Group
4.2a: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2003-2006
Rest of New England
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4.2b: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2008-2011
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4.2c: Changes in Coverage Rates in Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, Post-Period vs. PrePeriod
Rest of New England
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Age Group

40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
-5

0

Change in5insured rate 10

15

Figures 4.3a, 4.3b, and 4.3c show that coverage rates are higher for married women
than unmarried women, because of the availability of spousal health insurance coverage.
Massachusetts’ reform had an equalizing effect for unmarried women; insurance coverage
increased by almost 8 percentage points.
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Figure 4.3 Insurance Coverage Rates By Marital Status
4.3a: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2003-2006
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4.3b: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2008-2011
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4.3c: Changes in Coverage Rates in Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, Post-Period vs. PrePeriod
Rest of New England
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The changes in coverage rates by income are illustrated in Figures 4.4a, 4.4b and
4.4c. Insurance coverage was initially highest for women with incomes over 300 percent of
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the FPL, and the coverage gains were very small (2 percentage points). The coverage gains
were somewhat limited for the poorest women with incomes less than 150 percent of FPL
because many had health insurance coverage through Medicaid. In contrast, the middle
group with incomes between 150-300 percent FPL saw increases in insurance coverage of
12-14 percentage points.
Figure 4.4 Insurance Coverage Rates By Income Group
4.4a: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2003-2006
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4.4b: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2008-2011
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4.4c: Changes in Coverage Rates in Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, Post-Period vs. PrePeriod
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Finally, although women between 15 and 44 are often categorized as being of “childbearing” age, birth rates vary tremendously by age group. Older women in the sample are
more likely to have reached their desired number of children, and as such, one may not
expect the same fertility response to insurance coverage that would see with a younger
woman. We calculate a latent fertility variable that represents the propensity of a woman to
give birth that varies by age, marital status, and race. To construct latent fertility, we use two
datasets because the variable is computed as a ratio of the number of births occurring to
women within a demographic cell divided by the total number of women in that group and
there is no single dataset that provides this information. For the numerator we use the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s Vital Statistics data which records all births in
the U.S. for a particular year. We use natality data from 2003, the first year of our analysis, to
establish baseline fertility rates. We calculate the number of births for six age groups (16-19,
20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44), two marital statuses (married and unmarried), and
two races (white and non-white) for a total of 24 demographic cells. For the denominator we
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use weighted ACS data from 2003 to obtain the total number of women at risk for birth by
demographic cell.
As an example, to compute the latent fertility variable for married non-white women
aged 20-24 years, we divide the number of births to women in this demographic cell (59,984)
by the total number of women in the U.S. within the same cell (431,350) and obtain a latent
fertility rate of 13.9 percent for non-white, married women aged 20-24 years. The inverted-U
shape of latent fertility in Figure 4.5a illustrates wide variations of the propensity for having a
baby, with young women aged 20-34 being most likely to give birth. Birth rates among
married women are significantly higher for each age group than for unmarried women
(Figure 4.5b), reflecting a higher degree of child wantedness. Conditional on age and marital
status, race is not an important factor affecting latent fertility. We use the constructed
fertility rates in two ways. First, the obvious variation of latent fertility provides strong
motivation for stratifying the sample, both by age and by age and marital status. Second, as
part of the robustness checks, we interact the latent fertility rate with the insured rates to
evaluate how the change in insurance coverage rates affect the birth rates for different levels
of latent fertility.
Figure 4.5 Fertility Rates
4.5a: Fertility Rates By Age, 2003
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4.5b: Fertility Rates by Age/Marital Status, 2003
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4.6

Empirical Framework

As is well recognized, the Massachusetts reform creates a quasi-experiment to
evaluate the impact of expanding health insurance coverage on various outcomes. The
natural starting point for our examination of fertility is a straightforward difference-indifferences (DD) estimator estimated from a linear probability model:
(1)

ܪܴܶܫܤ௧ ൌ ߚ  ߚଵ ܵܵܣܯ ܱܶܵܲ כ௧  ߚଶ ܵܵܣܯ  ߚଷ ܱܲܵܶ௧  ߚସ ܺ௧  ߝ௧

where ܪܴܶܫܤ௧ is an dummy variable equal to one if woman i in state j at time period t had
a child in the past 12 months, ܵܵܣܯ is a dummy variable for living in Massachusetts
(relative to the other New England states – Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Vermont), and ܱܲܵܶ௧ is an dummy variable for the years 2008 and beyond
(relative to the years 2003-2006).62,63 We also include controls for the woman’s education
(high school dropout, high school graduate with college graduate being omitted), whether
the woman has changed residence in the past year, whether she has served in the military and
62
63

Results from a probit model are similar.
We omit the transition year of 2007.
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whether she is a non-citizen. In later specifications, we also interact age, marital status, and
poverty levels. The coefficient estimate on ߚଵ is then interpreted as the DD estimator.64
Although transparent, there are many reasons to go beyond the specification in
equation (1). Most importantly, although the near-universal health reform in Massachusetts
leveled coverage rates across groups, as discussed in the previous section, there were very
different gains based on one’s initial socioeconomic circumstances. Thus, we create a
parameterized version of equation (1) by attaching to each woman the insurance coverage
rate based on her state, time period, and demographic group (48 categories, 6 age x 4 income
x 2 marital status).65 Thus, equation (2), which forms our baseline specification of insurance
gains on fertility, is:
(2)

ܪܴܶܫܤௗ௧ ൌ ߚ  ߚଵ ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௗ௧  ߚଶ ܩܱܯܧܦௗ  ߚଷ ܺ௧  ߜ௦  ߜ௧  ߝ௧

where ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௗ௧ is the fraction of demographic group d covered in region j in period t.66
It is likely that the key components of ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௗ௧ – especially demographics like age and
marital status – have a direct effect on fertility; thus, we include a full set of dummy variables
for demographic group (ܩܱܯܧܦௗ ), as well as state and year fixed effects (ߜ௦ and ߜ௧ ). The
estimate of the impact of insurance coverage, ߚଵ, is identified from how Massachusetts’
changing health insurance landscape over time interacted with different demographic groups.
Since the identification of the insurance effect comes from the interaction of state, time and

The large majority of papers studying the effect of the Massachusetts health care law use some form of
difference-in-differences identification strategy. See for example, Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a), Courtemanche
and Zapata (2012), Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), Long et al. (2009), and Miller (2012a).
65 Similar methods for constructing a policy variable are consistently used by the literature examining the effect
of Medicaid expansions on various outcomes. This measure is typically the fraction of the population eligible
for Medicaid (DeLeire et al., 2011; Zavodny and Bitler, 2010; Currie and Gruber, 2001).
66 Since the variation in INSURED is at a higher level than the individual, all standard errors are clusters at the
DEMOG*STATE*YEAR level. The significance of the results is very similar if we simply cluster at the
STATE*YEAR level and the significance is much stronger if we cluster at the STATE level alone. Thus, we
view our results at the most conservative approach.
64
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demographics, we present further specifications that show the conclusions are relatively
robust to including finer controls like state-year interactions.
One key drawback to running equation (2) on the full sample, however, is that such a
specification imposes an equal marginal impact on fertility for gains in insurance coverage.
There are clearly reasons to think this should not be the case.67 As discussed in the prior
section, older women who are of childbearing age are likely to have reached their desired
number of children; as a consequence, one might not expect much impact on fertility for
them. Moreover, gains in insurance coverage not only reduce the cost of having a baby, but
also reduce the cost of preventing a pregnancy. One would expect that pregnancies are much
more likely to be wanted for married women, and unwanted for single women. Thus, the
estimate from equation (2) above could combine both positive and negative fertility
responses. As a consequence, in addition to examining the full sample, we separately stratify
by age group, and also age group and marital status.68 Further, we provide confirmation that
latent fertility matters greatly for the actual fertility response by estimating equation (3):
(3)

ܪܴܶܫܤௗ௧ ൌ ߚ  ߚଵ ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௗ௧ ܴܶܧܨ כௗ  ߚଶ ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௗ௧  ߚଷ ܩܱܯܧܦௗ
 ߚସ ܺ௧  ߜ௦  ߜ௧  ߝ௧

where ܴܶܧܨௗ is the latent fertility rate estimated from the 2003 Vital Statistics and ACS data
by age/marital status/race groups, and the other variables are defined as before. 69 Assuming
that pregnancies are wanted rather than unwanted, then one would expect ߚଵ to be positive.

Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) only include young, single, and low-educated women in their sample.
Zavodny and Bitler (2010) stratify the sample by race/marital status and race/education to analyze the
fertility effects.
69 The DEMOG variable is then changed to be the interaction of age, marital status, income and race. The
FERT variable is not included as a separate regressor because its variation is subsumed by the DEMOG
variable.
67
68
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4.7

Empirical Results

We first summarize fertility rates and insurance rates for our sample. Overall, the
sample consists of more than 500,000 women aged 15-44 in Massachusetts and surrounding
states. Nearly 8 percent report a birth in the past year, across all years. In addition, our
imputed insurance rate is nearly 92 percent – reflecting both the changes in Massachusetts
after 2007, and the high overall level of coverage in New England. Consistent with the Vital
Statistics data, fertility rates vary dramatically by woman’s age. More than 12 percent of
women aged 20-34 report having a baby in the previous 12 months, approximately five times
the rate of women aged 15-19 or 35-44. The fertility differences are especially pronounced
by marital status; nearly 21 percent of married women aged 20-34 reported having a baby,
more than three times the rate of unmarried women in the same age group.
Our first attempt at estimating the impact of insurance coverage on fertility is shown
in Table 4.4, corresponding to the difference-in-differences specification in equation (1). For
both the full sample, as well as each age group, one would conclude the expansions in
insurance had little effect on fertility. In all cases, the coefficient estimate is substantively
small and insignificant. As noted, however, this specification ignores many important aspects
about the fertility decision and the Massachusetts reform, in particular, the uneven gains in
insurance coverage, the different latent fertility rates by age group, and the differential
wantedness of pregnancies between married and unmarried women.
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Table 4.4 Difference-in-differences estimates
Impact of Massachusetts’ health reform on fertility
MASS*POST
MASS
POST
N
ଶ
Fertility rate
(pre-reform)
Sample

0.0002
(0.0028)
-0.0015
(0.0023)
-0.0014
(0.0021)
510,707
0.0087
0.0795

-0.0004
(0.0036)
-0.0015
(0.0031)
0.0000
(0.0026)
79,307
0.0118
0.0146

0.0020
(0.0052)
-0.0123
(0.0039)
-0.0081
(0.0047)
211,135
0.0037
0.1305

All

Ages 15-19

Ages 20-34

0.0004
(0.0045)
-0.0045
(0.0028)
0.0001
(0.0042)
114,650
0.0263
0.0599

0.0008
(0.0091)
0.0023
(0.0075)
0.0059
(0.0088)
96,485
0.0044
0.2011

0.0031
(0.0035)
-0.002
(0.0027)
0.0001
(0.003)
114,533
0.0023
0.0239

Ages 20-34,
Ages 20-34, Ages 35-44
Unmarried
Married
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR level. The “pre” period is 2003-2006 and the
“post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control states are Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent variable is: “Has this person given birth to
any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls included in regression are: education (dropout, HS
graduate, college graduate), non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if
they are aged 15-44, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital
status, or race.

Thus, we turn to Table 4.5, which estimates equation (2), by including the
parameterized insurance rate. As in the previous table, when one looks at the full sample or
particular age groups, insurance gains appear to have no effect on overall fertility. Yet, as
shown in columns (3) and (4), there are significant and opposite signed effects for unmarried
and married women aged 20-34. Recall this is the group with the highest latent fertility rate.
Although not shown, coefficient estimates are insignificant and much smaller for other
age/marital status groups. For unmarried women aged 20-34, insurance coverage increased
by 11.4 percentage points due to the Massachusetts law.70 With a coefficient of -0.0459, this
would imply that fertility fell by -0.52 percentage points. Since the pre-reform baseline
fertility in the ACS was 5.99 percent among this group, then fertility fell by 8.7 percent. For
married women, in contrast, gains in insurance coverage led to increased fertility. The overall
gain in insurance coverage was much more modest – 2.4 percentage points – which leads to
an increase in fertility of 0.23 percentage points from a much higher baseline of 20.11
percent. Thus, among married women, fertility increased by around 1 percent.
70

We ran difference-in-differences estimates similar to equation (1) to get the change in insurance coverage.

80

Table 4.5 Impact of insurance gains from Massachusetts’ law on fertility
ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௌǡ்ǡாெைீ
N
ଶ
Fertility rate
(pre-reform)
Sample

0.0103
(0.0211)
510,707
0.0778
0.0795

0.0040
(0.0481)
79,307
0.0394
0.0146

0.0130
(0.0273)
211,135
0.0653
0.1305

-0.0459**
(0.0216)
114,650
0.0526
0.0599

All

Ages 15-19

Ages 20-34

Ages 20-34,
Unmarried

0.0982*
(0.0504)
96,485
0.0155
0.2011

-0.0103
(0.0352)
114,533
0.0354
0.0239

Ages 20Ages 35-44
34,
Married
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR*DEMOG level. The “pre” period is 2003-2006
and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control states are Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent variable is: “Has this person given birth
to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls included in regression are: education (dropout, HS
graduate, college graduate), non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if
they are aged 15-44, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital
status, or race. All specifications include STATE fixed effects (6 categories), YEAR fixed effects (8 categories)
and DEMOG fixed effects (48 categories – 2 groups for marital status x 4 groups for poverty status x 6 groups
for age status). ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level

Given the striking differences in insurance coverage on married and single women,
one may ask whether the marriage decision itself is endogenous to the law. Yelowitz (1998)
found that the expansions in Medicaid in the 1980s and 1990s led to higher marriage rates.
The key difference between the Medicaid expansions and the more recent Massachusetts
context is that Medicaid had been traditionally targeted to poor female headed families on
cash welfare (poor married families were largely ineligible); hence the expansions in Medicaid
opened up eligibility to married couples and on the margin, created incentives to get married.
The expansion in Massachusetts, on the other hand, applied to all groups and was essentially
neutral with respect to marriage. In any case, we have run difference-in-differences
regressions (parallel to equation 1) where the outcome is whether the woman is married; for
both the full sample as well as each age group, the estimate is insignificant and substantively
small in all cases.71

Chen (2013) examines “marriage lock” and finds reductions in divorce and increases in marriage due to the
Massachusetts reform. She uses New Jersey and sometimes Connecticut as control states. Our findings on
marriage rates come from examining a younger set of women, and using New England states (which does not
include New Jersey) as our control group. Further investigation is certainly needed to reconcile her results on
marriage with our non-results.

71
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One concern about Table 4.5 is that the INSURED variable is a complicated
function of demographics, state and year. Although we include dummy variables for each of
the main effects, a concern may be that there are interactions of DEMOG, STATE and
YEAR that are also correlated with fertility decisions independent of the expansions in
health insurance coverage. For example, the Great Recession may have affected income or
employment in Massachusetts differently than the rest of New England, and those
differences, rather than health insurance coverage, may be driving the fertility decisions. In
Table 4.6, we test the sensitivity of the coefficient estimates to these kinds of stories for
women aged 20-34. For comparison, Columns (1) and (5) replicate the specification and
findings for unmarried and married women in the prior table. By including STATE*YEAR
effects in columns (2) and (6), we see that such state-specific shocks have little impact on the
underlying conclusions (if anything, the negative impact is slightly stronger for unmarried
women). The next columns add DEMOG*YEAR interactions (in addition to the
STATE*YEAR interactions). Although no longer significant, the coefficient estimate for
single women remains quite similar. For married women, the fertility effect is still positive,
significant, and much the same magnitude as before. Finally, when one fully saturates the
model,

by

including

fixed

effects

for

STATE*YEAR,

DEMOG*YEAR

and

DEMOG*STATE (thus, the identification comes only from the interaction of
STATE*YEAR*DEMOG in the INSURED variable), then neither estimate is significant,
although it is reassuring that the actual estimate is quite similar to the baseline estimate.
Overall, the findings for both unmarried women and married women hold up remarkably
well to including additional controls.
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Table 4.6 Sensitivity to set of control variables
Impact of insurance gains from Massachusetts’ law on fertility, Panel a
ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௌǡ்ǡாெைீ
N
ଶ
Fertility rate
(pre-reform)
Sample

-0.0459**
(0.0216)
114,650
0.0526
0.0599

-0.0637**
(0.0266)
114,650
0.0537
0.0599

-0.0589
(0.0388)
114,650
0.0554
0.0599

-0.0492
(0.0434)
114,650
0.0580
0.0599

Age 20-34
Age 20-34
Age 20-34
Age 20-34
Unmarried
Unmarried
Unmarried
Unmarried
Interaction Terms
STATE,
STATE*YEAR,
STATE*YEAR,
STATE*YEAR,
YEAR,
DEMOG
DEMOG*YEAR
DEMOG*YEAR,
DEMOG
DEMOG*STATE
(Table 4.4)
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR*DEMOG level. The “pre” period is 2003-2006
and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control states are Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent variable is: “Has this person given birth
to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls included in regression are: education (dropout, HS
graduate, college graduate), non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if
they are aged 20-34, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital
status, or race. ** = significant at 5% level, ** = significant at 10% level

Table 4.6 Sensitivity to set of control variables
Impact of insurance gains from Massachusetts’ law on fertility, Panel b
ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௌǡ்ǡாெைீ
N
ଶ
Fertility rate
(pre-reform)
Sample

0.0982*
(0.0504)
96485
0.0155
0.2011

0.0998**
(0.0501)
96485
0.0169
0.2011

0.1144**
(0.0544)
96485
0.0189
0.2011

0.0988
(0.0664)
96485
0.0222
0.2011

Age 20-34
Age 20-34
Age 20-34
Age 20-34
Married
Married
Married
Married
Interaction Terms
STATE,
STATE*YEAR,
STATE*YEAR,
STATE*YEAR,
YEAR,
DEMOG
DEMOG*YEAR
DEMOG*YEAR,
DEMOG
DEMOG*STATE
(Table 4.4)
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR*DEMOG level. The “pre” period is 2003-2006
and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control states are Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent variable is: “Has this person given birth
to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls included in regression are: education (dropout, HS
graduate, college graduate), non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if
they are aged 20-34, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital
status, or race. ** = significant at 5% level, ** = significant at 10% level

In addition to exploring the sensitivity of the specification to additional controls, we
consider one other important issue. There may be a concern that the generous health
insurance benefits in Massachusetts – with community-rated premiums and guaranteed issue
– makes the state a more attractive place for individuals with high expected medical costs,
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such as pregnant women and therefore encourage migration. It is important to note that if
this is the case, one might expect to see increases in fertility for all age groups, rather than
increases for married women and decreases for unmarried women. Nonetheless, selective
migration is clearly a concern.72 Using the CPS, Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) find that inmigration in Massachusetts fell relative to other New England states as a result of the law,
and this effect was particularly pronounced among adults aged 18-29. They interpret the
drop in in-migration for the young – who are largely healthy and have low expected medical
costs – as arising from the greater implicit tax on them arising from community rating and
individual mandates. The same factors that generate implicit taxes for most young adults also
create implicit subsidies for pregnant women.
The ACS asks about one-year-migration patterns, and allows us to test this
hypothesis. We restrict the sample to women who did not move across state lines in the
previous year, and estimate equation (2) on each group. Our results are quite similar to the
baseline results in Table 4.5. For the 94 percent of unmarried women aged 20-34 who did
not move across state lines, the coefficient estimate (standard error) is now -0.0422 (0.0222)
compared with the initial estimate of -0.0459 (0.0216). For the 95 percent of married women
aged 20-34 who did not move across state lines, the coefficient estimate (standard error) is
now 0.0821 (0.0538) compared with the initial estimate of 0.0982 (0.0504). In both cases, the
small fraction of cross-state moves would appear to have greater responses to insurance
coverage relative to non-movers, but the basic conclusions remain unchanged by restricting
the sample to non-movers.

Gelbach (2004) shows that among women likely to use welfare, movers move to higher-benefit states. Aizer,
Currie and Moretti (2007) and Marton, Yelowitz and Talbert (2012) explicitly account for the possibility that
relatively attractive Medicaid health insurance packages might induce migration across counties within a state.
72
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Finally, equation (3) interacts latent fertility with gains in insurance coverage and
includes the main effect for insurance coverage. In all specifications in Table 4.7, the
interaction term is positive, suggesting that gains in insurance coverage have positive effects
on fertility for those with higher latent fertility. The main effect of insurance coverage is
negative. This would be consistent with the findings in earlier tables, since married women
have higher fertility rates (and thus, the interaction term is relatively important), while
unmarried women have lower fertility rates (and thus, the main effect is relatively important.
Table 4.7 Interaction of insurance gains with latent fertility - Impact on fertility
ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௌǡ்ǡாெைீ
ܴܶܧܨ כாெைீଶ
ܦܧܴܷܵܰܫௌǡ்ǡாெைீ
N
ଶ
Mean of
dep. variable
Sample
Interaction Terms

0.8592**
(0.3413)
-0.0723***
(0.0272)
510707

0.8634***
(0.3419)
-0.0742***
(0.0285)
510707

0.7980**
(0.3838)
-0.0564**
(0.0334)
510707

0.4198
(0.4638)
-0.0297
(0.0382)
510707

All
All
All
All
STATE,
STATE*YEAR,
STATE*YEAR,
STATE*YEAR,
YEAR,
DEMOG2
DEMOG2*YEAR
DEMOG2*YEAR,
DEMOG2*STATE
DEMOG2
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR*DEMOG2 level. The “pre” period is 2003-2006
and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control states are Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent variable is: “Has this person given birth
to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls included in regression are: education (dropout, HS
graduate, college graduate), non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if
they are aged 15-44, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital
status, or race. All specifications include STATE fixed effects (6 categories), YEAR fixed effects (8 categories)
and DEMOG fixed effects (96 categories – 2 groups for marital status x 4 groups for poverty status x 6 groups
for age status x 2 races) *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level

Finally, we have examined an alternative definition of fertility. Recall that earlier
tables found that some women reported pregnancies but did not have infants living in the
household, and on many dimensions the missing infants varied logically with socioeconomic
characteristics like marital status, race and education. We have run similar specifications to
our baseline result, but where childbirth is now defined as having an infant present on the
household roster. Such a measure has difficulty in linking the infant to a mother when there
are multiple women of childbearing age in a household, or when the mother is missing from
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the household. Although we continue to find reductions in fertility for unmarried women
aged 20-34 and increases in fertility for married women aged 20-34, the coefficient estimates
are roughly one-third as large and not statistically significant. In our view, this provides
further evidence of the value of the self-reported pregnancy question over an approach that
imputes past pregnancy based on household configurations.
To test if the Massachusetts health care reform affected differentially the fertility
rates of women with different levels of educational attainment, model (1) and model (2) were
estimated separately for the sample of women with a high school diploma or less and for
women with at least a college degree. There is no indication that the reform had an overall
effect on the probability of having a child for women with different levels of educational
attainment which suggests that the near-universal provision of health insurance in
Massachusetts cannot be considered a determinant of differential fertility (difference
between the fertility rates of women with low levels of education and women with high
levels of education).
In summary, although the expansions in health insurance coverage had close to zero
net effect on fertility in Massachusetts, substantial heterogeneity exists for different
demographic groups. Our findings suggest that latent fertility and the wantedness of
children, along with differential gains in coverage, help explain opposite signed effects for
married and unmarried women aged 20-34, and also explain the non-existence of effects for
other groups. Married women in this age bracket increase their fertility when experiencing
gains in coverage because pregnancies are largely wanted and underlying fertility is high.
Single women, on the other hand, decrease their fertility because pregnancies are largely
unwanted and better access to contraception helps them prevent pregnancy. For women
aged 35 and older, latent fertility is quite low (and insurance coverage was typically high prior
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to the reform), so the overall fertility responses are small (and insignificant). For teenagers,
fertility rates are also quite low, many pregnancies are unwanted, and insurance coverage was
fairly high prior to reform. Thus, we find small and insignificant effects for them too.

4.8

Conclusions and Discussion

In this paper we examine the effect of the Massachusetts health care reform on a
woman’s probability of having a baby. Although we find zero net effect on fertility for
women aged 20-34, this masks substantial heterogeneity across married and unmarried
women (which proxies for child wantedness). Among young married women, fertility
increased by 1 percent while fertility decreased by 9 percent for young unmarried women.
We find no effect on birth rates for teens or older women either in total or when we stratify
by marital status.
Whether the reform simply shifted the timing of births or changed the total number
of children a woman will have in her lifetime remains an open question. Data over a longer
period than four years needed to assess the long-term fertility effect of the Massachusetts
reform. Regardless of whether the reforms simply reflect a change in timing, the proportion
of unintended pregnancies (those that are mistimed, unplanned or unwanted) fell as a result
of the law.
Our results are informative about the future consequences of the PPACA which was
largely modeled after the Massachusetts law. Expanding insurance would likely wanted
pregnancies on a national scale. To the extent that the contraception-related provisions of
the legislation remain unchanged, the national reform might also lead to a decrease in
unwanted births. Such a reduction in unwanted births could have favorable implications for
long-term crime trends in much the same way that legalizing abortion did (Donohue and

87

Levitt, 2001). Preventing an unwanted birth might lead to increased investment in women’s
own human capital and the human capital of their children thus increasing the overall level
of future human capital and affecting the future rates of economic growth. To the extent
that the reduction in unwanted births is due to increased use of contraception (rather than
increased abortion rates), potential savings could be realized in terms of resources spent on
unintended pregnancies.

Copyright © Maria Apostolova-Mihaylova 2014
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Appendices
Appendix 1.A
Variable Definitions and Instruments Used
Explanatory variable
GDP
I/GDP
G/GDP
AFR
GINI
TFR
DTFR
FRPIMARY
MFPRIMARY
AYSCHOOL (F)
AYSCHOOL (MF)
SSCHOOL (F)
SSCHOOL (MF)

Definition
Level of per capita GDP (initial)
Ratio of investment to GDP (average)
Ratio of government spending to GDP
(average)
Indicator variable for Africa
Measure of income inequality (0-100)
(average)
Total fertility rate (initial)
Differential fertility73
Female primary school completion rate
(average)
Male and female primary school completion
rate (average)
Female average years of schooling (average)
Male and female average years of schooling
(average)
Female secondary school completion rates
(average)
Male and female secondary school
completion rates (average)

Instrument
Square of initial per capita GDP
Initial I/GDP
Initial G/GDP
Own instrument
Indicator variable for sea access and
share of land in tropics
Square of initial total fertility rate
Life expectancy; Square of life
expectancy
Initial female primary school
completion rate
Initial male and female primary school
completion rate
Initial female average years of schooling
Initial male and female average years of
schooling
Initial female secondary school
completion rates
Initial male and female secondary
school completion rates

Differential fertility is measured in different years for different countries but generally towards the end of the
two periods in question.

73
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Appendix 1.B
Data Availability by Country by Period
Country
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burundi
Cameroon
Cantral Afr. Rep.
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Finland
France
Ghana
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Indonesia
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea Rep.
Lesotho
Liberia
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Namibia
Niger

1960-1976
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

1976-1992
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
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x
x
x
x
x

Country
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
U.K.
U.S.A.
Uganda
Venezuela
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1960-1976
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

1976-1992
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Appendix 1.C
Selected Summary Statistics
1960-1976
Variable
GROWTH
GDPini
I/GDP
G/GDP
AYSCHOOL (MF)
SSCHOOL(MF)
PRIMARY(MF)
SSCHOOL(F)
AYSCHOOL(F)
AFR
Gini
DTFR

Obs

Mean

40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40

0.036
7.428
18.326
16.158
4.067
7.238
21.122
5.454
3.870
0.150
44.318
2.231

Std.
Dev.
0.020
0.820
9.225
5.941
2.391
7.235
17.978
6.725
2.543385
0.361
11.135
1.556

Min

Max

-0.006
5.746
3.340
4.750
0.040
0.070
0.130
0
0.013
0
23.3
0.220

0.084
9.200
37.240
29.360
10
41.970
76.100
41.775
10.364
1
68.0
5.300

Min

Max

-0.035
6.111
1.940
9.230
0.690
0.630
2.700
0.433
0.376
0
28.9
0.100

0.050
9.080
23.880
36.520
8.010
29.800
35.000
28.667
7.817
1
69.0
4.500

1976-1992
Variable
GROWTH
GDPini
I/GDP
G/GDP
AYSCHOOL (MF)
SSCHOOL(MF)
PRIMARY (MF)
SSCHOOL(F)
AYSCHOOL(F)
AFR
Gini
DTFR

Obs

Mean

40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40

0.005
7.256
12.404
20.616
3.907
8.070
14.118
6.744
3.535
0.450
46.271
2.423
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Std.
Dev.
0.019
0.688
5.754
7.052
1.804
5.955
8.252
5.856
2.012
0.504
1.702
1.003

Appendix 2.A
Variable Definitions
gr

Average annual growth rate of real personal income per capita

y

Personal income: income received by persons from all sources

coll

Educational attainment (persons 25 and over): percent completing 16 years
or more of education

hs

Educational attainment (persons 25 and over): percent completing 12 years
or more of education

over65

Percentage of the population aged 65 years and over

dtfr

Differential fertility: difference between completed fertility rates of women
with low level of education and fertility rates of women with high level of
education

br

Birth rate: live births per 1,000 people in a given year

gini

Gini coefficient: “The average distance between all pairs of proportional
income in the population. Scale 0-1 (0 is perfect equality, 1 is perfect
inequality). Frank (2009)

atkin

The Atkinson index belongs to the class of welfare-based measures of
income inequality. It takes into account the sensitivity of observed inequality
to income changes in the ends of the income distribution by using an
inequality aversion parameter (Allison, 1978). The higher the inequality
aversion parameter, the more sensitive the index is to changes in the lower
end of the income distribution. The Atkinson index used here was calculated
with an inequality aversion parameter of 0.5 which makes it sensitive to
changes in the upper end of the income distribution. Bellu and Liberati
(2006) provide the following explanation of the Atkinson index: “The
Atkinson index is directly related to the class of additive social welfare
ଵ

functions: ܹ ൌ σୀଵ ܷሺݕ ሻǤ [This] [e]xpression say that social welfare is
ே

represented by average utility. The form of the function ܷ, according to
Atkinson, is the following: ܷሺݕ ሻ ൌ

ଵ
ଵିఌ

ݕଵିఌ  if ߝ ് ͳ or ܷሺݕ ൌ ሺݕ ሻ if

ߝ ൌ ͳ.”
theil

The Theil entropy index belongs to the entropy class of inequality indices
that measure deviations from perfect equality. Its distinguishing feature is
that it is a decomposable inequality measure which is sensitive to changes in
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the upper tail of the income distribution74. It is the sum of within-group
inequality and between-group inequality (Schorrock, 1980) and its advantage
over the Gini coefficient is that, since it is a decomposable measure, it is
informative of the importance of between group inequality for the overall
observed inequality. Shorrocks (1980) provides the following explanation of
the Theil entropy index: “If  ݕൌ ሺݕଵ ǡ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݕ ሻ is the income distribution
vector for a population of ݊ individuals, the Theil index can be written as
ଵ
௬
௬
௬
ܶሺݕǢ ݊ሻ ൌ σ   ݃ where ߤ is the mean income σ . Partition the

ఓ
ఓ


population into G disjoint subgroups where subgroup ݃ consists of ݊ ሺ


ͳሻ individuals with the distribution vector  ݕ ൌ ሺݕଵ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݕ ሻ and mean ߤ .
Then, using the fact that ܶ is symmetric over ݕ,
ܶሺݕǢ ݊ሻ ൌ ܶሺݕଵ ǡ  ݕଶ ǡ ǥ ǡ  ீ ݕǢ ݊ሻ ൌ
ଵ




 σ σୀଵ





௬

ఓ





௬

ఓ

ൌ σ

 ఓ

top1

Top 1% share of income

top10

Top decile share of income

74

ഋ

ଵ

ܶ൫ ݕ Ǣ ݊ ൯   σ ݊

ఓ
ఓ

݈݃

ఓ
ఓ

Ǥ”

See http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/445/theil_index_051en.pdf (accessed 5/15/2014).
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Appendix 2.B
Descriptive Statistics Selected Variables, entire period, 1970 - 2009
Variable
Growth rate of personal income (gr)
Ln personal income (y)
Differential fertility (dtfr)
Birth rate (br)
Income inequality (gini)
Top 10 share (top10)
Top 1 share (top1)
Theil entropy index (theil)
Atkinson (atkinson)
% completed college (coll)
% urban population (urban)
% population over 65 (over65)

N
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192
192

Mean
1.61
5.60
1.33
16.32
0.52
0.36
0.11
0.57
0.23
16.86
67.92
11.60

St. Dev.
1.00
0.26
0.40
2.61
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.22
0.05
6.63
14.64
2.08

Min
-0.93
4.62
0.26
10.70
0.42
0.28
0.06
0.33
0.16
4.78
32.20
6.30

Max
4.37
6.22
2.19
28.6
0.66
0.53
0.28
1.33
0.38
33.19
94.40
18.23

Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables, by Time Period
10-year Growth Episodes 1970-1979
Variable
N Mean
St. Dev.
Min
Growth rate of personal income (gr) 48 2.26
0.71
0.78
Ln personal income (y)
48 5.34
0.16
4.98
Differential fertility (dtfr)
48 1.75
0.26
1.09
Birth rate (br)
48 18.63
1.76
16.30
Income inequality (gini)
48 0.46
0.02
0.42
Top 10 share (top10)
48 0.30
0.01
0.28
Top 1 share (top1)
48 0.08
0.01
0.07
Theil entropy index (theil)
48 0.38
0.03
0.33
Atkinson (atkinson)
48 0.18
0.01
0.16
% completed college (coll)
48 8.22
2.11
4.78
% urban population (urban)
48 65.90
14.39
32.20
% population over 65 (over65)
48 9.87
1.68
6.30

Max
4.37
5.64
2.19
25.50
0.51
0.36
0.10
0.44
0.21
12.88
90.90
14.51

1980 - 1989
Growth rate of personal income (gr)
Ln personal income (y)
Differential fertility (dtfr)
Birth rate (br)
Income inequality (gini)
Top 10 share (top10)
Top 1 share (top1)
Theil entropy index (theil)
Atkinson (atkinson)
% completed college (coll)
% urban population (urban)
% population over 65 (over65)

48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

2.04
5.51
1.47
16.61
0.49
0.31
0.08
0.41
0.19
15.90
66.59
11.23

95

1.00
0.20
0.14
2.80
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.01
2.87
14.42
1.81

-0.67
4.62
1.05
12.50
0.45
0.29
0.06
0.36
0.17
10.40
33.80
7.49

3.89
5.97
1.70
28.60
0.55
0.35
0.10
0.49
0.22
23.00
91.30
17.32

1990 - 1999
Growth rate of personal income (gr)
Ln personal income (y)
Differential fertility (dtfr)
Birth rate (br)
Income inequality (gini)
Top 10 share (top10)
Top 1 share (top1)
Theil entropy index (theil)
Atkinson (atkinson)
% completed college (coll)
% urban population (urban)
% population over 65 (over65)

48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

1.65
5.70
1.07
16.05
0.56
0.37
0.12
0.65
0.23
19.62
67.76
12.65

0.38
0.17
0.19
1.56
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.10
0.02
3.76
14.66
1.78

0.75
5.25
0.51
12.60
0.53
0.34
0.10
0.51
0.20
12.33
32.20
8.72

2.52
6.06
1.41
21.10
0.62
0.43
0.19
0.96
0.28
27.23
92.60
18.23

0.72
0.16
0.40
1.79
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.20
0.04
4.35
14.91
1.66

-0.93
5.41
0.26
10.70
0.52
0.37
0.11
0.55
0.23
14.83
38.20
8.52

2.35
6.22
1.82
21.20
0.66
0.53
0.28
1.33
0.40
33.19
94.40
17.57

2000 - 2009
Growth rate of personal income (gr)
Ln personal income (y)
Differential fertility (dtfr)
Birth rate (br)
Income inequality (gini)
Top 10 share (top10)
Top 1 share (top1)
Theil entropy index (theil)
Atkinson (atkinson)
% completed college (coll)
% urban population (urban)
% population over 65 (over65)

48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

0.51
5.86
1.02
13.99
0.58
0.43
0.17
0.84
0.28
23.71
71.41
12.66
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Appendix 2.C
Trends in Differential Fertility by State, 1970-2000

97

98

Appendix 2.D
Tertiary Education Completion Rate for Selected Countries
Figure 1
Percentage of population 15 years and over with completed tertiary education for
selected countries by income inequality, 1960-1995

Percentage of population 15+ years with
completed tertiary education
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Source: Barro, Robert J., and Jong Wha Lee. "A new data set of educational attainment in
the world, 1950–2010." Journal of development economics 104 (2013): 184-198.
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Figure 2
Percentage of population 15 years and over with completed tertiary education for
selected countries by income inequality, 1960-1995
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